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The string of California Supreme Court cases establishing and 
elucidating groundwater pumping rights and rules for adjudicating 
them, culminating in the court 's 2000 decision in City of Barstow v. 
Mojave Water Agency, has produced a .framework that is .frustratingly 
rigid and unclear at the same time. Ful/y litigating the relevan! issues 
under that .framework is a potentially time consuming and expensive 
slog. The rigidity drives up the cost of proving rights and the 
appropriate formula for allocating water, while the uncertainty creates 
room for litigious mischief However, a close look at seven 
adjudications that have gane to judgment since Mojave shows a more 
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complex and interesting story. In five of those cases, the parties and the 
courts effectively finessed the property rights rules to reach relatively 
quick settlements that included creative groundwater management 
solutions. In two of the seven, however, the Mojave framework produced 
over a decade of litigation. Both lines of cases hold important lessons 
far groundwater management general/y, and far California as it moves 
forward in implementing the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
of2014. 
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l. lNTRODUCTION
Toe history of California groundwater law has been characterized by 
change, uncertainty, and local experimentation. Over most of that 
history, the state lacked a comprehensive statutory system for permitting 
groundwater withdrawals or managing groundwater consistently. The 
law has evolved instead through court adjudicated disputes under the 
common law of property rights in groundwater. As a result, the law's 
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evolution has been characterized by sudden changes of direction, usually 
in the form of a decision of the California Supreme Court, followed by 
severa! decades of efforts by lower courts, attomeys, and water users to 
either resolve or live with the uncertainty, followed by yet another shift 
announced by the court. Efforts to adapt to the evolving law of 
groundwater rights have produced a diversity of local experimentation in 
resolving disputes and managing groundwater. 1 
The most recent swerve in the common law occurred in 2000 with 
the California Supreme Court's decision in City of Barstow v. Mojave 
Water Agency2 (broadly known as the Mojave Basin decision, 
hereinafter "Mojave"). That opinion reemphasized the hierarchical 
system of property rights to groundwater after a period of 
experimentation with equitable apportionment by lower courts and 
litigants-all inspired by a 25-year-old footnote in City of L.A. v. City of 
San Fernando. 3 Mojave's emphasis on the priority of pumping rights 
was perceived by many as tightening the rules in a way that would make 
litigating adjudications more difficult and that might limit options for 
settling them. The Mojave decision's course correction, however, was 
modest compared to the seismic upheaval unleashed by the 2014 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act ("SGMA").4 Enacted in the 
midst of a historie drought, SGMA for the first time required a statewide 
system of sustainable groundwater management. This system covers the 
many important groundwater basins across the state that remain 
unadjudicated, including sorne that have been overdrafted for decades.5
With state oversight, local entities (Groundwater Sustainability Agencies 
or "GSAs," designated local govemments, water agencies, or newly 
created agencies) have been tasked with ensuring accomplíshment of the 
statute's goals.6
l .  W. BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA (1992). For a discussion of local control and experimentation, see R. Nelson, 
Assessing Local Planning to Control Groundwater Depletion: California as a Microcosm of 
Global lssues, 48 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 01502 (2012); see a/so, D. A. Sandino, 
California 's Groundwater Management Since the Governor 's Commission Review: The 
Consolida/ion of Local Control, 36 MCGEORGE L. REY. 471 (2005). 
2. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (2000).
3. See CityofL.A. v. CityofSanFernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 265,n.61 (1975).
4. The Act was made up ofthree separate bilis: SB 1319, SB 1168, and AB 1739.
5. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10727(aXl) (basins in chronic overdraft must comply on a 
shorter timeframc); CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER: WORKING 
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY l O, Bulletin 118 lnterim Update (2016) (identifying basins in chronic 
overdraft). 
6. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10723, et seq. (crcation of GSAs); CAL. WATER CODE §
10735, et seq. (state ovcrsight). For a discussion of the significance of SGMA in the context of 
California groundwater law and managemcnt, see T. C. Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible 
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Taken together, these two legal tuming points judicial and 
legislative raise critical questions for California groundwater law and 
management. B·asin adjudications have been much-maligned in 
California for being expensive, time consuming, and inefficient. 7 
Nonetheless, the resolution of adjudications has, in certain parts of the 
state, both produced innovative and effective groundwater govemance, 8
and provided certainty in their resolution of pumping rights. Mojave, 
when read in the context of prior cases; created a cloud of uncertainty 
over adjudications. At least sorne commentators and litigants in other 
adjudications have perceived Mojave as requiring a more scrupulous 
classification and quantification of groundwater rights and their 
priorities, potentially complicating adjudications. Other parties have 
seen the case as preserving a great deal of flexibility. SGMA, of course, 
creates a whole new world of groundwater management in over 125 
overdrafted California basins, and raises a host of questions. One of 
those questions is how SGMA will interact with property rights to pump 
groundwater and the system for adjudicating those rights. 
Our goals in this study have been two-fold. First, we have evaluated 
the seven adjudications finalized since the Mojave decision to assess its 
effect on the resolution of those adjudications. That evaluation also 
sheds light on the ability of parties to develop creative and effective 
groundwater management regimes against the backdrop of California 
groundwater rights as enunciated by Mojave an:d earlier cases. Second, 
we have assessed these adjudications for any lessons for the 
implementation of SGMA, and in particular how creative, proactive 
groundwater management regimes can be implemented in harmony with 
Califomia's property rights rules. This study involved a detailed 
document review including judgments and other court documents, 
annual reports, and management plans as well as seven interviews with 
attorneys who were closely involved in these cases. 
There have been seven basin adjudications brought to final judgment 
since the Mojave decision: Antelope Valley, Beaumont, Los Osos, San 
Measures: The Making of the California Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 5 (2016). 
7. T. C. Lcahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of the California
Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 13 (2016); R. Enion, 
Allocating Under Water: Reforming California 's Groundwater Adjudications, UCLA PRITZKER 
BRIEF No. 4, (UCLA School ofLaw/Emmett Ctr. on Climate Change and the Env't., Los Angeles, 
Cal.), Sept. 2013, at 4; GOYERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REYIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS 
LAW: FINAL REPORT, 237 et seq. (1978) [hcreinaftcr GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT]. 
8. See BLOMQUIST, supra note 1; R. McGlothlin and J. Acos, The Golden Rule* of Water
Management, 9 GOLDEN GATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 109, 116-123 (2016). 
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Jacinto, Santa Maria, Santa Paula, and Seaside.9 Five of these have been 
resolved through relatively collaborative settlements, and courts have 
entered stipulated judgments that have in sorne way finessed strict 
application of the property rights regime established over the course of 
the 20th century and clarified by Mojave. 1° Courts and litigants have, for 
the most part, found practica! solutions and then fit them into the Mojave 
framework, despite both the lack of clarity in the Mojave rules and the 
potentially very high transaction costs associated with implementing 
them. 11 As explained in this article, this approach has involved 
municipal water providers (all appropriative pumpers) essentially giving 
up their claims to prescriptive rights and reducing pumping in a way that 
dramatically limited the potential burden on overlying landowners of 
achieving safe yield. These adjudications have provided significant 
benefits for water users, including certainty, · durability, and a clear 
institutional framework for resolving future disputes (a watermaster 
overseen by the court). They also deploy groundwater management tools 
that could be used by groundwater sustainability agencies under SGMA, 
including groundwater allocation trading regimes. In short, the 
complexity and uncertainty associated with the California property 
rights regime as amplified by Mojave have hampered the resolution of 
disputes less than might be expected. 
However, the implications of these adjudications may be limited for 
GSAs in sorne unadjudicated basins that are required to comply with 
SGMA. The two post-Mojave adjudications that involved lengthy 
adjudication - Santa Maria (fifteen years) and Antelope Valley (sixteen 
years ) both involved large numbers of parties and significant disputes 
over property rights, including two central issues to resolving those 
disputes, safe yield and prescription. Many of the unadjudicated basins 
that are subject to SGMA are both highly overdrawn and include large 
numbers of water users. This may make the process of developing and 
implementing a plan to reach sustainable management as required 
under SGMA--quite challenging. 12 Adjudication remains an altemative 
9. Toe Santa Paula adjudication was originally decided in 1996, but thc judgment was
substantivcly amended in 2010, making it relevant for our inquiry. 
10. Santa Maria and Antclopc Vallcy both went through considerable litigation, although in
the end Antelope Valley was decided through a stipulatcd judgment. 
11. Sorne have termcd this infusion of practicality into the property rights regime as the
Goldcn Rule* (with an asterisk) of California groundwater law. See, e.g., McGlothlin & Acos, 
supra note 8, at 110 112. 
12. SGMA requires that in basins dcsignated by the California Dcpartmcnt of Water
Rcsources as high or mcdium priority, GSAs must dcvelop and implcment Groundwatcr 
Sustainability Plans (GSPs) to reach sustainablc management within twcnty ycars of plan 
adoption. GSPs must be adopted by 2022 in most ofthc 127 basins currently dcsignated as high or 
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in these basins and others, but as things stand now, it would appear to be 
a double-edged sword. Recent legislation seeking to harmonize SGMA 
and adjudications, as well as the flexible and creative approach that 
sorne litigants and courts have taken before and after Mojave creates the 
potential for adjudications to provide certainty and durabiJity for the 
SGMA process. Nevertheless, lengthy and contentious adjudications 
remain a threat to smooth implementation of SGMA, particularly where 
litigants push the Mojave decision to the limits regarding its mandate to 
prioritize and quantify pumping rights. 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Toe legal framework for groundwater rights in California is 
discussed extensively in the legal literature, 13 and we will only provide a 
brief sketch of major milestones that preceded Mojave. Toree decisions 
of the Supreme Court, as well as California's constitutional framework, 
create an evolving set of rules tbat have proved difficult to apply, 
particularly in complex cases. Indeed, a dissenter in one of those cases 
characterized the framework established by his own court as "a hodge­
podge of conflicting rules and principles," and a "confused state of 
affairs." 14 Below we summarize these three cases and their implications. 
A. Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903)
In this case, the Supreme Court established the basic framework for
allocating groundwater rights. 15 Toe Katz court rejected the argument 
that groundwater should be govemed by the common law rule of 
capture, which would have given overlying landowners rights to pump 
unlimited amounts of groundwater for use on their land. Instead, the 
court held that overlying landowners had "correlative" rights to 
medium priority, and by 2020 in 21 basins listed as "critically overdraftcd." See CAL. WATER 
CODE § 10722.4 (prioritization ofbasins), § 10720.7 (planning deadlines), and § 10727 et seq. 
(devclopment ofGSPs). 
13. See generally, J. L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater: A Morse! of California Legal
History, 6 U. DENYER WATER L. REY. 269 (2002); Eric Gamcr & Jill N. Willis, Right Back Where 
We Started From: The Last 25 Years of Groundwater Law in California, 36 MCGEORGE L. REY. 
413 (2005); Jan Stevens, California 's Groundwater: A Legally Neglected Resource, 19 HASTINGS 
W. Nw. J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y 3 (2013); J. M. Millcr, When Equity Is Unfair Upholding Long
Standing Principies of California Water Law in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REY. 991 (2001). 
14. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 938 (1949) (Carter, J.,
disscnting). Justicc Carter's cxpression of dissatisfaction with the doctrine of mutual prescription 
. in that case reachcd a peak (particularly given the era) when he rcferrcd to the doctrine as "based 
in bureaucratic communism." Id. at 940. 
15. )41 Cal. 116 (Cal. 1903).
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"reasonable use" of the waters in a given aquifer. This meant that 
overlying landowners shared rights to pump a portian of an aquifer' s 
safe yield 16 and put it to reasonable use on their land. The court created a 
second class of potential pumping rights: "appropriative rights," for uses 
that are not on overlying lands, such as municipal water supply. If
overlying landowners did not pump the entire safe yield, the surplus 
portian of that safe yield could be pmnped for non-overlying uses by 
appropriators on a first in time, first in right, basis. 
Katz left many critical questions unanswered, including: how to 
allocate water among overlying users; the rights of overlying 
landowners who are not pumping at the time of any allocation, but may 
wish to pump in the future; the definition of safe yield; and the 
limitations imposed by the notion of "reasonable" use. It is also worth 
noting that water use by municipalities, except perhaps for occasional 
irrigation, constitutes a non-overlying use, and the correlative rights 
doctrine relegates this highly valued use to the backseat for purposes of 
pumping priority. 
B. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949)
California had to wait over four decades for elaborations on this
system from the state's supreme court. In City of Pasadena v. City of 
Alhambra, 17 the court confronted the adjudication of a basin whose 
status mirrors that of many basins in California today. The Western Unit 
of the Raymond Basin had been in almost continuous overdraft since 
1913, and pumping exceeded safe yield by more than thirty percent. 18 n 
addition, a variety of users extracted water from the basin, including for 
overlying users pumping for irrigation as well as non-overlying 
municipal users. The basin also saw significant municipal growth 
leading up to the adjudication. 19
Toe parties and the trial court were confronted with a conundrum 
16. Gencrally, safe yield refcrs to thc amount of water that can be withdrawn from a
groundwater basin without causing harmful cffects, such as a chronic lowering of groundwater 
levels. However, adjudications vary in how they define this term. For a review, see K. Rudestam 
and R. Langridge, Sustainable Yield in Theo,y and Practice: Bridging Scientific and Mainstream 
Vernacu/ar, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINAL NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 
GROUNDWATER, 52: 90 99 (2014). 
SGMA spccífies síx --undesírable results" that must be avoidcd in order for a basin to be operated 
withín its "sustaínable yicld." See CAL. WATER CODE § 10721 (v) (w). 
17. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d at 938.
18. Id. at 922.
19. See LANGRIDGE ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF CALIFORNJA'S ADJUDICATED
GROUNDWATER BASTNS 51 et seq. (2016). 
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that would become familiar in California. The community of users had 
become dependent on levels of water use amounting to overdraft. Under 
strict application of the doctrine of correlative rights first announced by 
Katz v. Walkinshaw, the growing city of Pasadena and surrounding 
communities, as appropriators, risked losing any share of the safe yield. 
Even if overlying pumpers did not use the whole safe yield, more recent 
municipal pumpers risked losing their share of the safe yield under 
principies of seniority. Due to the extent of overdraft, overlying 
landowners were at risk of losing their water rights under traditional 
application of the doctrine of prescription. The leading parties to the 
case all perceived substantial risk to litigation because of the uncertain 
and complex system of water rights.20
Toe parties were able to reach a settlement and stipulated judgment, 
but not by relying on the primacy of overlying landowners or seniority 
rules for the appropriators. Rather, the parties relied on the simplest 
possible principle all parties would reduce their production of 
groundwater by a proportional amount needed to bring the basin to safe 
yield. The parties justified that approach, and the trial court approved it, 
based on the theory that all pumpers had acquired rights of "mutual 
prescription" against each other. Prescriptive rights to groundwater most 
typically arise where an appropriator uses groundwater in excess of safe 
yield and "the use is actual, open and notorious, hostile and adverse to 
the original owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period 
of five years, and under claim of right."21 If it can prove a prescriptive 
right, an appropriative pumper can acquire a share of the safe yield even 
if the basin is overdrafted. Prescription in water rights was not new in 
California, but the parties and the court took it a step further by holding 
that extensive, long-term overpumping meant that all users had created 
rights of mutual prescription against each other, and that as a result "all 
rights are of equal standing, with none prior or paramount. "22 This 
doctrinal innovation justified a settlement formula whereby the 
reduction in pumping did not fall on any particular class of pumpers, but 
rather should be proportionate to each water user's level of pumping that 
had led to overdraft. 23
Only one party appealed the trial court's decision. That party argued 
that no prescriptive rights accrued, because the overpumping did not in 
fact restrict any individual pumper' s ability to pump and use the water 
20. BLOMQUIST, supra note 1, at 78.
21. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d at 926 27.
22. Id. at 928.
23. Id. at 933; BLOMQUIST, supra note 1, at 79-80.
2018] A FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK 193 
that they needed. The Court rejected that argument based on the notion 
that the lowering of the aquifer level, and the diminishment of the 
overall availability of water in the future, constituted adequate injury to 
give rise to a prescriptive right: 
Each taking of water in excess of the safe yield, whether by 
subsequent appropriators or by increased use by prior appropriators, was 
wrongful and was an injury to the then existing owners of water rights, 
because the overdraft, from its very beginning, operated progressively to 
reduce the total available supply. 24 
Toe court's justification for the ultimate result proportionate 
reductions in pumping was not based solely the formal rules of 
prescriptive rights and its extension of those rules. The court also viewed 
shared, proportionate, reductions in pumping as a fair and efficient 
resolution of the problem of extensive overdraft by a variety of water 
users: 
Moreover, it seems probable that the solution adopted by the trial 
court will promote the best interests of the public, because a pro tanto 
reduction of the amount of water devoted to each present use would 
normally be less disruptive than total elimination of sorne of the uses. 25 
A caustic dissent notwithstanding, 26 the Raymond Basin resolution 
holds great appeal for exactly the Court's reasons-minimal disruption 
and a dose of fairness when compared to cutting off sorne municipal 
water users in favor of overlying irrigators. Proportional and shared 
reductions hold great potential as the most efficient means of resolving 
disputes about an overdrafted groundwater basin. Transaction costs for 
litigation and settlement are relatively low, as the only questions that 
remain are the extent of overdraft and the appropriate baseline of 
pumping from which to measure each pumper's proportionate 
reduction. 27 Even if the resulting allocation of water includes elements 
of inefficiency, these can be remedied by a trading mechanism for 
24. Id. at 928.
25. Id. at 933.
26. Justice Carter dissented on the primary grounds that the "principies of water law were
disregarded," and that the dccision below "made a determination based upon thc quantity of water 
available and the rcquiremcnts of the respective parties, and divided the water accordingly, 
regardless of prior appropriations, prescriptive rights, or rights of overlying owncrs." Id. at 939 
(Carter, J., dissenting). He also observed that the court's decision addcd to a "confused state of 
affairs" that had been created by "the hodge podge of conflicting rules and principies enunciated" 
by California courts. 
27. Proportional reduction is an examplc of a "focal point" solution to a coordination
problcm. See T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conjlict (1960); R.H. McAdams, Beyond the 
Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordina/ion, Game Theory, and Law, 82 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA L. REY. 
209 (2009). 
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potential shifts in pumping allocations and rights. It took sorne doctrinal 
choreography, but the parties and courts in City of Pasadena effectively 
framed California groundwater rights law to facilitate resolution of 
groundwater management disputes and overdraft. 28 
Indeed, in the wake of the City of Pasadena decision, mutual 
prescription, and the formula of proportionate reductions, "was viewed 
as a convenient device courts could use to reach an acceptable result."29
Toe framework became the basis for resolving many adjudications. 30
The formula allowed litigants to reach agreements, usually incorporating 
a physical solution, where resolution of appropriative priorities might 
have been too complex or disruptive. 31 
The City of Pasadena decision <lid not, however, fully eliminate the 
potential for disputes about property rights or for costly litigation. 
Prescription requires a five-year period of pumping in excess of safe 
yield. Lack of monitoring, absence of pumping records, and Califomia's 
extreme variation in annual precipitation render proof of five 
consecutive years of overdraft challenging, time consuming, and prone 
to dispute. A variety of other issues related to prescription, including the 
scope of terms like "open and notorious" as well as "hostile and 
adverse" were not fully litigated in the case, as only one party dissented 
from the stipulated judgment. In addition, the court's approach in 
requiring uniform reductions has shortcomings. It <loes not address how 
to handle future demand that might diverge from past pumping, and the 
decision might create an incentive for each pumper to maximize their 
use to set a higher baseline for the proportionate reduction. 32 
C. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975)
Many of these issues carne to a head twenty-six years later in the
28. The case also dealt with an issue that remains troublesome to this day, that of
unexcrcised ovcrlying rights. The court held that these rights wcre lost in effcct because existing 
pumpers had acquired prcscriptive rights to the entire safc yicld. City of Pasadena v. City of 
Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d at 931 32. 
29. G0VERNOR'S COMMISSI0N REP0RT, supra note 7, at 142.
30. Id. See general/y A. J. Schneider, Groundwater Rights in California: Background and
lssues, Staff Paper No. 2 to the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law 
at 23-24 (1977) (discussing aftermath of Pasadena and citing Water Service Co. v. Sidebotham & 
Son, 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 37 Cal. Rptr. I (1964) (West Basin); Central and West Basin Water 
Replenishment Dist. v. Adams, Civil No. 786656 (L.A. Cty. Super. Ct. Octobcr 11, 1965) (Central 
Basin); and Upper San Gabriel Va/ley Municipal Water District v. City of Alhambra, Civil No. 
924128 (L.A. Cty. Super. Ct. January 4, 1973) (San Gabriel Basin). 
31. Id. at 24.
32. For a discussion ofhow City of Pasadena contributed to a "race to thc pump," see J.H.
Krieger and H.O. Banks, Groundwater Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REY. 56, 61 62 (1962). 
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adjudication ofthe San Femando and adjacent basins, together known as 
the Upper Los Angeles River Area, decided by the California Supreme 
Court in 1975.33 This adjudication is a major source ofthe qualms about 
groundwater adjudications in California. Los Angeles originally filed the 
case in 1955. It took thirteen years to get to trial in 1968, another seven 
years to wind its way to a final decision by the California Supreme 
Court, and four more years to reach a final judgment in the trial court. 34 
Los Angeles filed the case in order to assert its rights to groundwater 
underlying the upper Los Angeles River in the San Fernando Valley 
against a backdrop of rapid urbanization of the area and increasing water 
demand. 35 Although irrigated agriculture had been a prominent user of 
water in the San Fernando Valley, at the time of the litigation most of 
the use had shifted to urban, and the primary parties to the adjudication 
were cities or water agencies serving municipal users. 
Los Angeles claimed preeminent rights to all the waters, surface and 
ground, of the upper Los Angeles River basin. Their claim relied on a 
number of theories, including pueblo rights dating from the Spanish 
colonial era that had previously been adjudicated, and rights to capture 
retum flows of water Los Angeles had imported to the area. 36 The trial 
court was faced with the prospect of disrupting access to groundwater 
for severa! municipalities that relied upon it for their water supply, 
although those risks were significantly mitigated by a new supply of 
imported water arriving through the State Water Project.37 To resolve 
this tension, the trial court essentially followed Pasadena, finding 
mutual prescription on behalf of and against each of the primary parties, 
setting baseline pumping allocations using each pumper's five highest 
continuous years of production, and reducing the allocation of each 
proportionately to bring the basin into safe yield: 
Toe [trial] court found that its determination of mutually prescriptive 
rights and limitation of extractions of water will result in an equal 
sharing of burdens and promote the public interest and that a pro tanto 
limitation of water devoted to its present uses would be less disruptive 
than total elimination of sorne of the uses. 38 
33. City of L.A. v. City o/San Fernando, supra note 3, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975).
34. Id. at 208; LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 78.
35. Id. at 208 10.
36. Pueblo rights have been recognized by the courts as paramount bascd on municipal
water uses first asserted under Spanish and Mexican law. Id. at 21 O. 
37. Indeed, Los Angeles madc the point that the case was rcally just about money, because
any party losing sorne of their groundwater supply would simply makc up thc dcficit through 
purchasing more expensive imported water. Id. at 2 I 2. 
38. Id. at 220. 
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Toe Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with all of the arguments Los 
Angeles had made against mutual prescription. Sorne of the arguments 
had limited applicability to other cases, or even were unique to that set 
of parties, but many could be more broadly applicable, and set up future 
obstacles. The court's holdings included the following: 
Los Angeles held valid pueblo rights to the surface water and nátive 
groundwater ofthe San Fernando basin and one other basin. 
Los Angeles and other parties had rights to all of the water they had 
imported which, either through intentional spreading or incidental return 
flows, contributed to basin recharge. 
Cities and other public entities were immune from prescription 
claims with respect to water rights held for public use. 
Toe term "safe yield" includes pumping that causes aquifer level 
decline where that decline frees up aquifer storage space to capture 
temporary water surpluses that occur during wet years. This is relevant 
both to calculation of available safe yield and assessment of when the 
basin was in overdraft for purposes of the elements of mutual 
prescription. 
Toe fact that the basin had gone into overdraft, although sufficient to 
constitute adversity for purposes of prescription, was not by itself 
enough to constitute evidence of notice to groundwater rights holders 
adequate to start the statutory period needed to support a claim of 
prescription against those rights. 
With respect to one of the basins in dispute, that the evidence had 
not been adequate to show any full five-year period of overdraft needed 
to create prescriptive rights. 
San Fernando is sometimes described as limiting prescriptive rights 
as well as the doctrine of mutual prescription. 39 While that is certainly 
true with respect to public entities, just as importantly the court made 
clear that at the trial level, parties and courts could not shortcut the 
technicalities ofprescription and needed to provide evidence of all ofthe 
elements of prescription. The decision thus provided a roadmap for any 
party to litigate the issues of prescription or mutual prescription, should 
they choose to do so for whatever motivation. 40 Toe case also 
dramatically shifted, at least in sorne cases, the balance between 
appropriators and overlying users set up by Katz. The immunity of 
39. Lcahy, supra note 7, at 12.
40. lndccd, as we will discuss later, the potential of prescriptivc rights to curtail futurc
pumping rights of ovcrlying landowncrs is onc of the primary issues that has been litigated by 
propcrty rights advocatcs in adjudications over thc last twenty ycars. See infra at 45 (discussing 
Santa Maria adjudication). 
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public entlt1es from prescription sets up the possibility of unilateral 
prescription by those entities against overlying pumpers, creating the 
risk that overlying rights would be reduced by the amount of 
prescription, shifting the balance between public water providers and 
overlying pumpers. The holding may reduce the incentive for those 
municipal providers to accede to the universal proportional reduction 
formula used in City of Pasadena. 
While this roadmap for proving mutual prescription may be the most 
important doctrinal shift to come out of the San Fernando opinion, one 
of its footnotes ended up having almost as much potential impact. San 
Femando and the other defendants (opposed in the case to Los Angeles) 
deployed the argument that mutual prescription represented "a 
beneficent instrument for conservation and equitable apportionment of 
water in ground basins which are subjected to extractions in excess of 
the replenishment supply."41 The court agreed that its authority to 
administer and apportion water rights was beneficia!. 42 However, the 
court compared mutual prescription unfavorably to the more 
sophisticated, broader approach embodied by the separate doctrine of 
equitable apportionment: 
In the second place, the allocation of water in accordance with 
prescriptive rights mechanically based on the amounts beneficially used 
by each party for a continuous five-year period after commencement of 
the prescriptive period and before the filing of the complaint <loes not 
necessarily result in the most equitable apportionment of water 
according to need. A true equitable apportionment would take into 
account man y more factors. 43 
At the end of this clause, the court added the now much cited 
"footnote 61," in which it analyzed the factors used by the United States 
Supreme Court in applying equitable apportionment in interstate water 
disputes, and their relation to the priority rules goveming water rights: 
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and 
clima tic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections 
of the river, the character and rate of retum flows, the extent of 
established uses, the availability of storage water, the practica! effect of 
wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as 
compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed 
on the former these are all relevant factors. They are merely an 
illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the 
41. City of L.A. v. City of San Fernando, supra note 3, at 265.
42. Id. at 265.
43. Id. at 266.
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problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which 
must be made. 44 
None of this is directly relevant to any of the court's holdings. The 
invocation of equitable apportionmeht might best be read as just an 
argument to help illustrate the deficiencies of mutual prescription and 
proportionate reduction, and to call into question one of the arguments in 
its favor - overall fairness and a rough preservation of existing uses of 
water. 
Nonetheless, it would be hard to blame trial courts and parties. to 
adjudications for seizing on this language as opening the <loor to a more 
sensible approach to adjudications, especially if the path to universal 
mutual prescription and shared reductions is more arduous and risky. 
Absent equitable apportionment, or something lik:e it, courts hearing 
adjudications would be faced with a gauntlet of imposingly technical 
issues subject to difficult means of proof, including: 
drawing basin boundaries; 
calculating safe yield while factoring in the extent of retum flows of 
imported water and any temporary surplus that can be pumped to free up 
storage space; 
calculating·historical overdraft, both on an average basis, and on an 
annual basis in order to evaluate the five-year statutory period for 
prescriptive rights; 
assessing the historical pumping of individual users; 
determining what notice various pumpers had of the level of 
overdraft; and 
how to allocate water between existing uses and potential future uses 
by overlying rights holders. 
Courts would have to do all this in addition to categorizing pumpers 
as having overlying, appropriative, or prescriptive rights, and 
prioritizing pumpers by those categories. These courts would have to 
conduct discovery and trials of these issues in cases, often involving 
dozens or even hundreds of groundwater pumpers. Courts, and more 
importantly parties trying to negotiate a solution to a basin in overdraft, 
would understandably be drawn to principies of equitable apportionment 
as a more appealing roadmap to settle a case than those priority rules 
and the effort required to apply them. Indeed, the Govemor's 
Commission to Review California Water Rights, issued three years after 
City of San Fernando, explicitly noted that the decision "suggested that 
sorne form of equitable apportionment may be worked out for each 
44. id., n.61 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
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case."45 
One immediate impact of the San Fernando decision was to make 
the use of universal mutual prescription and proportional and shared 
pumping reductions more difficult. This helped put an end to the first 
attempt to adjudicate the Mojave groundwater basin. Although that 
adjudication faced a host ofproblems,46 at the time of the San Fernando 
decision the parties had negotiated a settlement based on a Pasadena­
style theory of mutual prescription and proportionate reduction. The 
challenges posed by San Fernando were enough to kill that settlement 
deal and the adjudication itself. The San Fernando decision also clearly 
shaped the 1978 Chino Basin stipulation and judgment, which placed 
overlying pumpers and appropriators into separate pools, allocated safe 
yield between the two first, and then apportioned the appropriative 
pool's share among the individual appropriators.47 Finally, it may have 
influenced delays in the Santa Maria Basin adjudication, which was 
initially structured to treat overlyers and appropriators differently, but 
ultimately went to trial on, among other issues, that of prescriptive 
rights.48 Toe complexity of post-San Fernando adjudications such as 
Chino and Santa Maria fed skepticism about the adjudication process in 
general. 
The California courts had, in the seventy-two years between Katz 
and City of San Fernando, made minimal progress towards establishing 
clear rules for resolving disputes about groundwater overdraft and the 
relative priority of different pumping rights. As the Govemor's 
Commission Report put it in 1978: 
Overall, groundwater law is at a point of great uncertainty. Mutual 
prescription probably cannot be imposed in most cases. Application of 
the correlative and appropriation principies is probably impractical since 
their application would be exceedingly complex. At this time, a 
groundwater user in a basin which has not previously been adjudicated 
can have only a very uncertain idea of what his "right" actually is. 49 
III. MOJAVE ADJUDICATION AND DECISION.
Adjudication of groundwater rights in the Mojave River area, 
located in San Bemardino County, stretched the regime outlined above 
45. GOYERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, 143.
46. BLOMQUIST, supra note 1, at 236; Govcmor's Commission Staff Paper No. 2, supra
note 30, at 29. 
47. BLOMQUIST, supra note 1, at 279 281. 
48. LANGRJDGE, supra note 19, at 237-40. 
49. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 143.
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to the breaking point not once, but twice. As indicated above, the 
restrictions on mutual prescription announced in San Femando
contributed to a decision by litigants to abandon in 1976 an initial 
attempt to adjudícate the basin that had been filed in 1966. Parties filed a 
second attempt to adjudícate the basin in 1990, and quickly reached a 
stipulated judgment that included a variety of creative measures to 
allocate groundwater, share the burdens of pumping reductions, and 
manage groundwater efficiently for the long-term. Although this 
settlement was a success on a variety of fronts, its legal foundation, 
which depended heavily on the doctrine of equitable apportionment, was 
rejected by appellate courts. The Supreme Court of California ultimately 
held that the stipulated judgment could not be enforced against non­
settling parties, because it <lid not adequately take into account the 
priorities of the rights of individual pumpers. 
Although doctrinally the Mojave Basin decision50 is known for 
reasserting the relative priorities of the three classes of groundwater 
rights, the adjudication and its settlement in many ways stands for the 
triumph of common sense and innovation over legal formality. The 
Mojave adjudication was highly complex, perhaps more so than any of 
the adjudications that led to the California Supreme Court's prominent 
groundwater rights decisions. A large number of water users pumped 
from the aquifer, evidenced by over 1,000 water producers that were 
served as part of the adjudication (a group that <loes not include minimal 
pumpers).51 The basin was also highly overdrafted. In the decades 
leading up to the ultimate adjudication, the basin saw both explosive 
population growth and an increase in irrigated agriculture, most 
prominently the cultivation of alfalfa. 52 This combination drove 
overdraft to very high levels indeed for example, in 1981 pumping 
exceeded 208 thousand acre-feet, while renewable supply may have 
been as low as forty-five thousand acre-feet. 53 Furthermore, the basin is 
comprised of five subareas with varying levels of overdraft, making it 
necessary to resolve the effects of pumping in each individual subarea 
on the other four. Finally, the case included a dispute about whether 
water pumped along the Mojave River should be classified as 
percolating groundwater (not subject to regulation by the state) or water 
flowing in an underground river (subject to regulation by the state as 
50. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, supra note 2. 
5 I. Mojave Basin Area Adjudication, Judgment After Tria/ 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Riverside
Cnty. 1996) (hereinafter Mojave Tria/ Court Decree]. 
52. LANGRIDGE,supra note 19, at 189; BLOMQUIST, supra note!, at 222-23.
53. BLOMQUIST,supra note!, at 222 and tbl.10.1.
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surface water). 54 As one attomey involved in the case described it: 
We were not physically capable of doing a water rights allocation in 
Mojave. lt was impossible, because we had 6,600 wells. Most of them, a 
lot ofthem, were almost in the bed of the Mojave River. Many, many of 
them, thousands of them, were close to the river. .. [I]t would 
theoretically have required a hydrologic investigation well by well by 
well in order to break those up, allocate the water rights, and then try to 
coordinate the two regimes of California water laws; the administrative 
regime of stream water running under the surface or percolating 
groundwater. It was a Gordian knot that couldn't be untied. 55 
Toe City of Barstow filed the adjudication in 1990. Toe city, which 
is positioned at the downstream end of the basin, alleged that the basin 
was overdrafted and sought a declaration that the lower basin was 
entitled to a delivery of 30,000 acre feet of water from upper areas of the 
basin. 56 Toe Moja ve Water Agency (MW A) filed a cross complaint also 
alleging the basin was in overdraft, seeking a declaration ofwater rights, 
and naming several hundred groundwater pumpers as parties to the 
adjudication. 57 At the time, the general consensus of the parties and 
their lawyers was that, given the complexities outlined above, 
adjudication of individual pumpers' rights, categorization of all of those 
rights as appropriative, prescriptive, or overlying, and assessment of the 
relative priorities of those rights, would be impossible. 58
Recognizing these difficulties, the court almost immediately (1991) 
suspended litigation activities to give the parties an opportunity to settle 
the case. The parties created a committee of engineers and lawyers 
representing a cross-section ofwater users to work on a settlement. After 
approximately two years of work and the expenditure of "several 
hundred thousand dollars"59 (which seems a bargain for solving a 
Gordian knot!), the committee presented the court with a "stipulated 
interlocutory order and judgment." A handful of parties declined to sign 
the stipulation and requested a trial. The court held a trial in 1995 and 
entered a final judgment in 1996. Toe sole issue at trial was whether the 
54. See general/y JOSEPH. L. SAX, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHTNG THE SWRCB's
PERMITTING AUTHORITY ÜVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS 
SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS ANO THE SWRCB'S lMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS, SWRCB No. 
0-076 300-0, Final Rcport (2002).
55. lntcrvicw with attorney involvcd in thc Mojave and Santa Maria adjudications (namc
on file with authors), (August 18, 2016) [hereinaftcr lntervicw 1]. 
56. Mojave Tria/ Court Decree, supra note 51, at 1.
57. Id. A variety of other partics also filcd complaints and cross complaints.
58. lnterview 1, supra note 55.
59. Mojave Tria/ Court Decree, supra note 51, at 5.
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terms of the stipulation could be applied against those parties (ultimately 
termed "the Cardozo parties"). The Cardozo parties alleged that the 
stipulation violated their rights as overlying landowners and sought to 
have those rights adjudicated, quantified, and enforced. The trial court 
enforced the terms of the stipulation against them, enjoined any 
pumping in the basin not pursuant to the stipulation, and estopped the 
parties from asserting any "special priorities or preferences."6º 
Before getting to the legal technicalities, it is worth taking a moment 
to appreciate the work of the settling parties in the Moja ve case, and the 
creative vision of the settlement. In two years, the parties overcame 
technical, political, and legal problems that had derailed the previous 
effort to adjudicate the case expeditious work by the standards of 
groundwater disputes. The stipulation includes many tools that almost 
thirty years later are being touted as "innovations," the adoption of 
which could be critically important for SGMA's effective 
implementation in many groundwater basins.61 Toe stipulation gives 
each pumper covered by the judgment a "Base Annual Production" 
(BAP) right which represents their percentage share of an initial overall 
pumping level for their basin subarea. Every year, each party is 
allocated a "Free Production Allowance" (FP A), which represents the 
amount, calculated as a percentage of their BAP, that they are allowed to 
pump each year without incurring pumping charges. Toe FPAs were 
initially set at the same level of pumping ·as the BAPs, but then went 
down a total of 20 percent over the first five years the stipulation was in 
effect. The stipulation gives the watermaster (the MWA), under the 
supervision of the court, the power to further reduce the FP As if needed 
to achieve sustainable yield. Any pumper can sell all or a portion of 
either their BAP (permanently or for a period of years) or their FP A 
(annually). Pumpers that exceed their FPA in any year pay a fee based 
60. Id. at 21.
61. A markct systcm for re allocating groundwatcr rights, central to thc Mojavc.scttlcmcnt,
is now, more than twenty ycars latcr, being touted as key to thc succcssful implementation of 
SGMA. See M. Y oung and B. McAtecr, Sharing Groundwater: A Robust Framework and 
lmplementation Roadmap fo.r Sustainable Groundwater Management in California (Working 
Papcr NI WP 17 02, Dukc Nicholas Institutc, 2017); Ayres, Andrew B., Eric C. Edwards, and 
Gary D. Libccap, How Transaction Costs Obstruct Collective Action: Evidence from California 's 
Groundwater (National Bureau of Economic Rescarch Working Paper 22382, 2017). 
www.nber.org/papcrs/w23382. For a discussion of conditions undcr which groundwatcr markcts 
are most likely to be succcssful, see GREENNYLEN, NELL, MICHAEL KIPARSKY, KELLY ARCHER, 
KURT SCHNIER, ANO HOLLY DOREMUS. TRADING SUSTAINABLY: CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR LOCAL GROUNDWATER MARKETS UNOER THE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER 
MANAGEMENT ACT 90 (Ctr. for L., Encrgy & thc Env't, UC Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, 
CA.). 
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on the cost of acquiring supplemental water in the amount of their 
overpumping. Finally, in a step that makes Mojave unique among 
adjudications, the stipulation made provisions for environmental 
protection. The stipulation set standards for groundwater levels near the 
Mojave River in order to maintain riparian habitat. It also created a trust 
fund, funded by a special assessment on groundwater production, to buy 
water, drill wells, or implement other projects in the event the standards 
for groundwater levels were not rriet. 62
As noted above, the parties believed that the case was too complex 
to determine and prioritize overlying, prescriptive, and appropriative 
water rights for each pumper, and also that enforcement of water rights 
priorities would be unfair and disrupt the local economy. 63 This 
conclusion carried forward to the trial court's judgment: 
Toe physical and legal issues of the case as framed by the complaint 
and cross complaint are extremely complex. Production of more than 
1,000 persons producing water in the Basin has been ascertained. In 
excess of 1,000 persons have been served. The water supply and water 
rights of the entire Moja ve Basin and its hydrologic Subareas extending 
over 4,000 square miles have been brought into issue. Most types and 
natures ofwater rights known to California law are at issue in the case.64
The trial court went on to argue that Article X, Section 2 of the 
California Constitution required "the definition of the individual rights 
of all producers in the Basin Area in a manner which will equitably 
allocate the natural water supplies and which will provide for equitable 
sharing of costs for Supplemental Water."65 In allocating water and 
developing the physical solution, 66 the court relied on a combination of 
equitable apportionment principies and an undefined aspect of the 
62. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 192.
63. Interview 1, supra note 55.
64. Mojave Tria/ Court Decree, supra note 51, at 5.
65. Id. at 6. 
66. A physieal solution is an equitable remedy that a court may cnter to resolve a water
rights dispute without necessarily adjudicating ali rights. Originally, it was a rclatively narrow 
doctrine that allowed the court to order a remedy whereby junior water rights holders aeeessed 
water that would otherwise go to senior rights holders, in exchange for funding an altemative 
water supply for senior rights holders. See City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 7 
Cal. 2d 316, 341 (1936). Toe term has cxpanded to include broader equitable remedies. As 
described in the Seaside judgment, it is "an equitable remedy designed to alleviate overdrafts and 
the consequential depletion of water resources in a particular area, consisten! with the 
constitutional mandatc to preven! waste and unreasonable water use and to maximize the 
beneficial use of this state's limited rcsource." California American Water v. City of Seaside, 183 
Cal. App. 4th 471,480 (2010). See a/so, A. LITTLEWORTH & E. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER II 
172 et seq. (2007) (defining physical solution as "a common scnsc approach to water rights 
litigation" and discussing California cases) (citations omitted). 
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priority of the water rights of producers: 
Toe Declaration of Water Rights that is part of the judgment and the 
Physical Solution decreed herein takes into consideration the competing 
priorities which have been asserted in addition to the equitable principies 
associated with the allocation of water in. this situation. 67
The court identified eight different factors that it relied on in the 
allocation of rights and physical solution, many of which overlapped 
with footnote 61 of San Fernando, including unfairness that might result 
from strict application of priority, economic stability, hydrologic 
conditions, and the availability of storage or other sources of water. 68
Toe court included in its list of factors the fact that "[n]one of the 
priorities asserted �y any of the Producers is without dispute," a finding 
that "[ u ]nder the complex scheme of California water law, the allocation 
of water rights mechanically based on the asserted priorities would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, and would not result in the most 
equitable apportionment of water," and finally, its conclusion that 
"[ s ]uch mechanical allocation [ of water rights priorities] would, in fact, 
impose undue hardship on many Parties. "69
Embedded within the Mojave judgment's stance on equitable 
apportionment, however, is a certain degree of deference to overlying 
rights holders. Toe first attempt to adjudícate the Mojave basin had been 
undermined by agricultura! opposition. In an effort to bring in as many 
overlying pumpers into the stipulation as possible, the stipulation 
included a number of attractive provisions for them. 70 The stipulation 
calculated each overlying pumper's BAP on the highest level of 
pumping during the five years preceding the filing of the adjudication. 
This allowed farmers and ranchers, who rotated their crops and varied 
their planted acreage, to start with an allocation based on their maximum 
water use. The decision to use the highest level, rather than the lowest or 
the average of the five years, benefited irrigators more than cities, whose 
use did not vary as much from year to year. In addition, the stipulation 
included the option of selling one' s BAP or FPA, which gave irrigators a 
financia! off ramp if growing crops proved unprofitable, either in a given 
year or for the long term. The stipulation also allowed overlying users to 
sell their net pumping, rather than their consumptive use, even though 
_
67. Mojave Tria! Court Decree, supra note 51, at 19.
68. Compare Mojave Tria! Court Decree, supra note 51, at 20 with City of L.A. v. City of
San Fernando, supra note 3, at 266, n.61. 
69. Id. at 20.
70. Interview 1, supra note 55. 
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cities had lower consumptive use rates.71 
The settling parties initiated the focus on equitable apportionment, 
rather than property rights priorities, as a legal justification for the terms 
of the stipulation. 72 Toe trial court fully bought in, however, not just by 
adopting the stipulation, but by deciding to impose the apportionment on 
the "Cardozo parties," who dissented from the stipulation. The focus on 
equitable apportionment provided the primary grounds for those parties 
to appeal the case. 
At the time, the trial court's reliance on footnote 61 of the San
Fernando decision created hope of moving California groundwater law 
towards a more flexible, less formalistic approach to apportioning 
groundwater rights.73 Indeed, the trial court's approach was consistent
with the recommendations of the Governor's Commission on California 
Water rights, issued twenty years earlier.74 Both the California Court of 
Appeals and the California Supreme Court let the stipulation stand, but 
overturned the trial court's decision to apply its terms to the non­
stipulating parties. Representatives of the stipulating parties argued that 
the trial court's reliance on principles of equitable apportionment was 
allowed, and indeed mandated by Article X, Section II of the California 
Constitution, which provides that "the water resources of the State be 
put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and 
that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of 
water be prevented."75 Toe stipulating parties argued both that uses in 
excess of safe yield were unreasonable, but also that strict enforcement 
of water rights priorities would have resulted in unreasonable uses of 
water or at least uses less reasonable and less beneficial than equitable 
apportionment, violating the clause's mandate to put waters to the 
"fullest extent" ofbeneficial use of which "they are capable."76
Toe Supreme Court rejected this argument. It reasoned that although 
the Constitution's mandate of reasonable and beneficial use might limit 
71. Id.
72. Id. ("What wc were trying to do at tria! was get the court to adopt it as a pcnnancnt
judgrnent, which he did, but by then we kncw wc had something like 90 to 95 percent of the 
agricultura! production stipulated, because they got ali ofthese concessions"). 
73. See E. Gardncr and S. Andcrson, The California Supreme Court Reviews the Mojave
River Adjudication, 2 U. DENVER WATER L. REV. 26 (1999); R. Sugcnnan, The Mojave Basin 
Physical Solution: lt"s a Good Idea, But Is lt Good Law, 6 HASTINGS W N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y 307 (2000). 
·74_ GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 169 (rccommcnding cquitable
apportionment as mcthod for groundwatcr allocation). 
75. CAL. CONST., art. X,§ 2.
76. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, supra note 2. at 1237.
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the amount of water available to any given user, it di4 not supplant the 
priority system of rights: 
Toe constitutional amendment therefore dictates the basic principies 
defining water rights: that no one can have a protectable interest in the 
unreasonable use of water, and that holders of water rights must use 
water reasonably and beneficially. Crucial to our own determination 
here is the fact that the amendment carefully preserves riparian and 
overlying rights ... 77 
The court reaffinned the priority system of water rights, even in the 
context of a physical solution: 78 
Thus, water right priority has long been the central principie in 
California water law. The corollary of this rule is that an equitable 
physical solution must preserve water right priorities to the extent those 
priorities do not lead to unreasonable use. In the case of an overdraft, 
riparian and overlying use is paramount, and the rights of the 
appropriator must yield to the rights of the riparian or overlying owner. 79
Although the Supreme Court overtumed the decision to apply the 
principies of equitable apportionment to limit the Cardozo parties' 
overlying rights, it left considerable equitable wiggle room for future 
courts. The Supreme Court found the trial court's reliance on City of San 
Fernando misplaced because that case "is not precedent for wholly 
disregarding the priorities of existing water rights in favor of equitable 
apportionment in this state, where water allocation has been based on an 
initial consideration of owners' legal water rights."8º The Supreme 
Court concluded: 
Thus, although it is clear that a trial court may impose a physical 
solution to achieve a practical allocation of water to competing interests, 
the solution' s general purpose cannot simply ignore the priority rights of 
the parties asserting them. 81 
Much as the Supreme Court's decision in San Fernando overtumed 
the trial court's reliance on Pasadena v. Alhambra's mutual prescription 
approach, the Supreme Court's decision in Mojave overtumed the trial 
court's reliance on San Fernando's equitable apportionment analogy. In 
77. Id. at 1242.
78. The primacy of the priority system of water rights in the context of a physical solution
is particularly significant. Historically, a physical solution was a remcdy within thc equitable 
powcr ofthe courts that served as an alternative to full enforcemcnt ofwater rights. See supra note 
66 (discussing sources). 
79. Mojave, 23 Cal. 4th at 1243.
80. Id. at 1247 48 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1250 ( emphasis added).
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addition, the Mojave decision provided few, if any, clear guidelines for 
trial courts hearing other adjudications. Neither the opinion nor the 
court's holding did much to clarify the meaning ofto "wholly disregard" 
or to "simply ignore" priority rights. Although the trial court had not 
determined the priorities of the various pumpers' rights, it had not 
wholly disregarded them. The trial court included the priority of the 
various rights asserted in its list of factors it considered in the 
declaration of rights and physical solution. The stipulation also gave 
overlying rights holders the benefit of a baseline of their most intensive 
water use over the relevant five-year period and more favorable 
treatment in the market than appropriators. It might have changed the 
posture of the case, at least slightly, if the trial court had relied on these 
preferences more heavily in its opinion. 
Despite the vagueness of the Supreme Court's language in Mojave, 
the case does seem to include at least two bright line holdings. The first 
is that equitable apportionment is not the law of California for purposes 
of determining allocations between different classes of rights holders 
(although the door is left open for using equitable apportionment in 
disputes between overlying pumpers). The court made that quite 
explicit. The second, which can be inferred, but not with much effort, is 
that trial courts cannot simply decline to classify and prioritize different 
types of property rights to groundwater in ordering a physical solution. 
As referenced earlier, the stipulation did include numerous 
concessions to overlying landowners. In the words of one of the 
attomeys involved: 
We approached this in a way where, as I argued successfully to the 
court of appeals, that. .. to the extent you were an overlying property 
owner. .. we would create a judgment that was very, very kind to you in 
very many ways. 82
One can infer from the Supreme Court decision that the preferences 
granted in the judgment did not satisfy the test of "not simply ignoring" 
property rights priorities, although the trial court decision did not tee this 
issue up as well as it could have. Another possible way of reading the 
court's decision is that, in an overdrafted basin, the overliers are entitled 
to the entire safe yield, and that a trial court must allocate the safe yield 
to them absent sorne finding of prescription. Once that is done, the court 
has flexibility in terms of allocating rights among overliers and setting 
up a system for transfers to appropriators. 
As we will see in our discussion of adjudications since Mojave, 
82. Interview 1, supra note 55.
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several of those cases have placed the burden of reductions needed to 
achieve safe yield either entirely or predominantly on appropriators. 
This approach favors overlying pumpers in the allocation of rights much 
more clearly than the preferential treatment in the Mojave settlement. 
Those settlements go muéh farther towards meeting the test of not 
"simply ignoring" priority rights, although they are vulnerable to one 
critical argument. If pumping by overlyers has either equaled or 
exceeded safe yield, non-overlying users are not entitled to any water 
absent a finding that they have prescriptive rights. In a case involving a 
basin in long-term overdraft and a dispute between overlyers and 
appropriators, it would be very difficult after Mojave for a court to avoid 
grappling with the difficult issue of prescriptive rights, or to address 
comparably difficult issues of waste, unreasonable use, and 
unreasonable allocation. 
The Supreme Court's holding could point to at least two different 
doctrinal directions. First, the Supreme Court could simply have been 
reacting to the trial court's strong reliance on the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment, and making quite clear that the doctrine was not, under 
California water law, the primary basis for allocating water. This reading 
might give trial courts hearing ( and parties settling) adjudications a wide 
degree of flexibility in terms of the precise type of preference and 
priority they give to the different categories of rights holders. This is the 
view set out in a recent piece by McGlothlin and Acos, which 
emphasizes the flexibility of California water rights law. That article 
argues that the mandate of Article X, Section 2 of the California 
Constitution, combined with the public trust doctrine, requires an 
assessment in each case that "seek[s] to maximize water's social utility 
through a balancing of social, economic, and environmental interests the 
'triple bottom line. "'83 Toe ultimate result of the application of this 
balancing should result in "optimizing of the net social utility achieved 
from balancing the costs and benefits of all potential uses of water, 
including non-consumptive uses."84 Mojave, however, <loes impose 
sorne limits on this rule by requiring "due regard for common law water 
right priorities."85 Toe article goes on to argue that this "due regard" 
requires "harmonizing" optimized beneficia! use with the certainty 
needed by property rights holders, and that this harmonization can be 
implemented in a variety of ways, including by allocating the burdens of 
83. McGlothlin & Acos, supra note 8, at 111.
84. ld.
85. Jd. at 112.
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a physical solution pursuant to water rights priorities. 86 
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Second, the Mojave opinion could be read as reaffirming the need to 
adjudícate individual water rights in groundwater adjudications, where 
those rights are being asserted, and holding that courts must classify 
pumpers into the relevant classes of rights and resolve priority disputes 
between them. This would result in exceedingly complex, expensive, 
and time-consuming adjudications, particularly in large basins with 
many groundwater users. In addition to considering the various factors 
needed to assess overdraft, prescriptive rights, and mutual prescription, 87
the court would have to assess reasonable use by each pumper, arrive at 
a method for apportioning safe yield among overlying pumpers, devise a 
mechanism for reducing pumping, and implement any relevant physical 
solution. Under this approach, in an overdrafted basin nonoverlying 
users would risk losing their right to pump absent a finding of 
prescription against overlying users. Under San Fernando, if the non­
overlying users are municipalities or other public agencies, those users 
could acquire prescriptive rights against irrigators, but corresponding 
mutual rights of prescription would be unavailable for those irrigators. 
This in tum would disrupt existing pumping pattems in favor of urban 
users, because, presumably, irrigators would have to reduce their 
pumping by a greater proportion to reflect the degree of prescription. 
Each class of pumpers would appear to face the same risk of losing all or 
a substantial portion of their pumping rights that led to the settlement in 
Pasadena v. Alhambra more than ffty years before Mojave. 88
Toe reactions to Mojave have followed those two tracks. Sorne have 
seen it as a victory for formalism that could prolong adjudications that 
were filed and intimidate the filing of others. Eric Gamer, one of the 
lead attomeys in the Mojave adjudication, took this perspective shortly 
after the case was decided. 89 Other commentators have seen it as more 
of a reminder to avoid "wholly disregarding" priority of asserted rights, 
while not completely tying courts' hands or stifling the creativity of 
parties working to resolve adjudications and other groundwater 
disputes. 90 
86. Id. at 117 ("The distribution of burdens of water management is the locus of the
Mojave Rule, which instructs that the burdens must be imposed consistent with common law 
water right priorities. "). 
87. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 67.
88. BLOMQUIST, supra note 1, at 78 79.
89. E. Garner, Right Back Where We Started From: The Last 25 Years of Groundwater
Law in California, 36 MCGEORGE L. REY. 413 (2005). 
90. · McGlothlin & Acos, supra note 8, at 112; see a/so, J. Miller, When Equity is
Unfair Upho/ding Long Standing Principies of California Water Law in City of Barstow v. 
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Indeed, one could argue that the Supreme Court decision in the 
Mojave adjudication was not momentous for management of the Mojave 
basin itself, or at least not determinative. The dissenting pumpers made 
up less than 20 percent of the overall pumping. The innovative 
management regime, including the transferability of both BAPs and 
RP As proceeded without those pumpers, and a good deal of water 
shifted from agriculture to urban uses through the market.91 Despite 
their objections to the stipulation, many of the Cardozo parties 
ultimately sold their rights as part of the market created by the 
adjudication.92 Toe Mojave Water Agency, acting as watermaster, has 
continued to tweak the terms of the stipulation, under the supervision of 
the court. The stipulation has produced one of the most robust markets 
for groundwater rights in the state. 93 Despite all of this, three of the five 
basin sub-areas remained in overdraft as of 2014, in part because of the 
failure to adequately clamp down on pumping, but more importantly 
because pumping allocations in the judgment were based partly on 
presumed sources of supplemental water that did not pan out. 
Toe uncertainty associated with the groundwater rights regime, 
along with the extreme expense of fully litigating all the factual and 
legal issues needed to establish groundwater rights priorities under the 
stricter reading of Mojave, risks an inefficient allocation of water 
resources. Beginning in the early 20th ·century, groundwater began to 
become scarce in parts of California, particularly the densely populated 
southem metropolitan areas. That scarcity became more acute and 
broader late in the century, with groundwater overdraft in parts of the 
Central Valley, the Central Coast, and elsewhere. Under traditional 
theory, property rights should become stronger and clearer in this 
context in order to avoid a "tragedy of the commons."94 While the 
Mojave Water Agency, 32 MCGEORGE L. REY. 991, 1014 16 (2001) (discussing future viability of 
cquitable apportionment in California). 
91. The markct in BPAs and FPAs is perhaps one ofthe most significant achicvcments of
thc scttlement. Pumpers havc engagcd in 625 transfcrs of BP As totaling 235,481 AF of water and 
eosting $125 million. Permanent Transfers of Base Ann. Prod. Rts. [1994 2017), MOJA VE BASTN 
AREA WATERMASTER (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.mojavewater.org/files/l 994_2017 _Pcrmanent.pdf (last visitcd Apr. 21, 2018). Thcy 
have also engagcd in 4,167 tradcs of FP As totaling 785,162 AF of water and costing $96.6 
million. Temporary Transfers [1994 2017), MOJAVE BASIN AREA WASTERMASTER (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.mojavewater.org/filcs/1994_20l7_Temporary.pdf (last visited April 21, 
2018). 
92. lnterview 1, supra note 55; lntcrview with attorney involvcd in the Santa Paula and
Seaside adjudications (name on file with authors), (Nov. 21, 2016) [hcrcinafter Intcrview 7). 
93. GREEN NYLEN ET. AL, supra note 61, at 47. 
94. See C. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Rea/ignment of Common Law Water Rights,
19 J. LEGAL STUO. 261, 262 63 (1990). 
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enforceability of pumping rights priorities in theory strengthens property 
rights, that inference is undercut by the quirks and nuances of the 
California system, including the difficulty in enforcing those rights 
through adjudication, the high cost of quantifying rights, the dual 
uncertainty associated with prescriptive rights, and the high level of 
uncertainty associated with litigating all of those issues. The high level 
of overdraft in the Central Valley took place in the context both of this 
level ofuncertainty associated with property rights, as well as the lack of 
an overall regulatory framework. 
We have evaluated all seven adjudications finalized since the 
Mojave decision to assess how the property rights regime set out above 
has affected their outcomes, and whether disputes over property rights 
have driven the complexity and duration of litigation, or whether parties 
and courts have opted for the more flexible reading of Mojave and its 
predecessors. We have also examined these cases for insights into how 
the adjudication regime might coexist with the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act. These adjudications demonstrate that, although 
potential exists for extensive litigation over property rights, in many 
cases parties have been able to resolve adjudications and adopt creative 
strategies for managing groundwater. They have done this in part by 
effectively adopting a clear rule of supremacy of overlying rights, while 
also setting up a system for reallocating those rights to urban users into 
the future. 
IV. POST-MOJA VE ADJUDICATIONS
In examining the adjudications that have been finalized since the 
Mojave decision, it is evident that the internal tensions in that decision 
and its predecessors have not been resolved. The need to prioritize and 
quantify rights, and particularly to cope with disputes about prescription, 
has driven sorne cases to lengthy and costly litigation. Nonetheless, the 
opinion appears to have left parties in other cases enough flexibility to 
develop settlements based on innovative and practical water 
management tools. However, the importance of property rights has 
driven the form and strategy ofthose settlements. 
There have been seven adjudications finalized (brought to final 
judgment in the trial court) since the Supreme Court's decision in 
Mojave: Beaumont (2004), Seaside (2006), Santa Maria Valley (2008), 
Santa Paula (2010),95 San Jacinto (2013), Antelope Valley (2015), and
95. Santa Paula was originally finalizcd in 1996. Wc havc included it bccause thc tria!
court amendcd thejudgment significantly in 2010. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 212. 
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Los Osos (2015). As shown in Table 1, two of these were only finalized 
after extensive, adversaria! litigation: Santa Maria (15 years) and 
Antelope Valley (16 years). The other five were settled fairly quickly 
(with the exception of Los Osos), and were resolved with relatively little 
contention by using various approaches to granting overlyers priority. 96 
Table 1 also highlights another key distinction between the two groups 
of cases: the number of parties involved. The two litigated cases involve 
far larger numbers of individual rights holders and parties. In addition to 
raising transaction costs of negotiating a settlement, the larger number of 
parties increases the lik:elihood that at least sorne rights holders would 
want to dispute a settlement in the courts. 
Table l. Overview of adjudications since the 2000 Mojave 
California Supreme Court decision. 
Adjudication Year of Length of No. of Major 
final processª partiesh groundwater 
judgment uses (yearr 
1996, 6 years (10 423 named 57% urban, 
Mojave appeal including producers, 25% 
decided in appeal) over 1000 agricultural, 
2000 served 10% 
wetlands, 8% 
other (2015) 
96. Ali were resolved in fewer than threc years after filing, with the exccption of Los Osos,
which took 11 ycars to rcsolve. However, a portion of those 11 years was consumed with 
resolving local political conflict, including a recall clection of the board of the Los Osos 
Community Scrvices District, lcading to that cntity's bankruptcy and ultimately the county taking 
ovcr the rcsponsibility for building a wastcwatcr trcatmcnt plant. Intcrview with attomey in volved 
in thc Los Osos adjudication (name on file with authors), (Oct. 11, 2016) [hcreinafter Interview 5]. 
In 2007, the parties reached an agrcemcnt rcsulting in an intcrlocutory stipulatcd judgmcnt, undcr 
which they agrccd to jointly dcvclop a Basin Managcmcnt Plan. Finalizcd in 2015, this plan 
became thc basis for thc final judgment. Updatcd Basin Plan for thc Los Osos Groundwater Basin, 
January 2015, at 3, Los Osos Community Services District v. Golden State Water Company et al., 
No. CV 040126 (Cal. Super. Ct. for San Luis Obispo County, Sept. 2015). This approach is 
distinct from Antelope Vallcy and Santa Maria, whcrc a significant numbcr of ycars wcre 
consumed with adversaria! legal proccdurcs. 
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Beaumont 2004 1 year 22 83% 
overlying, 
17% 
Group I: appropriati ve 
Settled 2015 
Cases Seaside 2006 3 years 16 100%urban 
(amended (2016-17) 
in 2007 
Santa 1996 5 years (to 103 25% urban, 
Paula (amended initial (including 75% 
in 2010) judgment) 101 agricultura! 





San 2013 1 year 5 (includes 54% urban, 
Jacinto "prívate 32% 
pumpers agricultura!, 
group ofup 4% pumped 
to 100 by Soboba 
individuals} tribe {2016} 
Los Osos 2015 11 years, but 4 63% urban, 
4 between 37% 
complaint agricultura! 
and (2016) 
in ter locutory 
judgment 
Santa 2008 11 years (15 1000 (750 15% urban, 
Group Maria (appeal with appeal) stipulated) 83% 
Il: decided in agricultural, 
Litigated 2012) 2% other 
Cases 2015 
Antelope 2015 16 years Over 4,000 33% 
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Number of years between complaint and final judgment, except 
where noted. 
At the time of the final or amended judgment. 
Data obtained from SGMA-mandated annual reports (available at 
http://sgma.water.ca.gov/adjudbasins/report/publicview), in the years 
indicated for agricultural and urban uses. These data are not available for 
Beaumont and Antelope Valley, so reported pumping by overlying and 
appropriative users is used instead. Appropriative nearly always 
represents urban uses, and overlying is primarily but not completely 
agricultural. Source for Beaumont is the 2015 Annual Report, Beaumont 
Basin Watermaster, Table 3-4 (available at 
http://documents.yvwd.dst.ca.us/bbwm/documents/2015AnnualReportFI 
NAL161207.pdf) and for Antelope Valley, the Final Antelope Valley 
Watermaster 2016 Annual Report, Appendices E and F ( available at:
http:/ /www.avek.org/fileLibrary/file  753 .pdf).
The two sets of cases treat property rights very differently, but both 
demonstrate vitality of those rights in the wake of the Moja ve case. The 
two protracted cases were made contentious by litigants' intent on 
asserting the rights of overlying owners, and their lengthy resolutions 
were driven in part by the complexities of resolving disputes between 
appropriators and overlying pumpers, particularly with respect to 
prescriptive rights. The other five cases were settled in a far less 
contentious manner, with the litigants dodging the issues of 
prioritization of rights and prescription by placing most or all of the 
burden of pumping reductions on appropriators and creating voluntary 
market mechanisms to make that that burden more flexible and 
manageable. In effect, appropriators have reduced the cost of litigating 
and settling by abstaining from asserting any prescriptive rights and 
assuming the supremacy of overlyers in order to establish clarity in the 
system, and then setting up a market system to allow transfers of rights 
from irrigators to municipalities and other management measures. We 
discuss each case below, beginning with Group 1, which we refer to as 
"settled cases." Table 2 summarizes how key water rights issues have 
been addressed in cases within the two groups. 
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Table 2. Approaches to water rights in adj udications since the 
2000 Mojave decision. 
Adjudication Treatment of Role of Burden of Trading Exernption Treatment 
overlying prescription reductions to allowed? for rninimal of 
rights reach safe producen unexercised 
yield rights 
 Beaumont Entire safe Not argued Appropriators Yes Less than 10 Not 
yield granted were allowed AFY discussed 
to overlyers. 1 O years of explicitly, 
Group 
1:iut Rights are surplus 
1: 
Settled 
quantified pumpingbut judgment 
individually then rights allows for 
cases 
and judgment reduced to the addition 
allows for zero except ofnew 
transfers f om for any rights parties. 
overlyers to transferred 
appropriators. from 
who are overlyers, or 
granted rights storage of 
to store water. imported 
water. 
Seaside Overlyers can Judgment Standard Yes Less than 5 Not 
choose f om found mutual allocation AFY discussed 
two classes of prescription holders must explicitly, 
rights: but does not reduce to zero but 
Alternative, impose equal befare judgment 
enabling them reduction Altemative allows for 
to avoid requirements� producers the addition 
reductions but make any ofnew 






Santa Members of Not argued The Yes Less than 5 Not 
Paula pumpers' appropriative AFY explicitly 
association party (City of addressed. 
have Buenaventura) 
individually bears the 
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Adjudication Treatment of Role of Burden of Tradlng Exemptlon Treatment 
overlying prescrlption reductions to allowed? for minlmal of 
rlgbts reach safe producers unexercised 
yield rigbts 
quantified primary 
rights assessed burden of 









San Overlyers Not argued Appropriators Yes Less than 25 New 
Jacinto have three bear entire AFY purnpers 
options: 1) burden (up to may join the 
participate 10% judgment, 
under Class A, reductions per but only as 
which avoids year for 6 Class A 
reductions but years to reach participants. 
allows no safe yield). 
trading, 2) 
participate 






trading, or 3) 
do not 
participate. 
Los Osos Overlying Not argued Appropriators No Judgment Judgment 
rights holders bear the entire exempts ali exempts ali 
not included burden. overlying overlying 
as parties to pumpers rights 
the judgment. holders so 
Their water new 
use is overlying 
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Adjudication Treatment of Role of Borden of Trading Exemption Treatment 
overlying prescription reductions to allowed? for minimal of 
rights reach safe producers unexercised 
yield rights 
accounted for pumpers 











Santa Overlying Grants Limits on No (only No Judgrnent 
Maria rights holders prescripti ve pumpingcan of exemption, acknowledg 
Group are granted the rights to two only be reservoir but es 
11: entire safe public imposed by water in judgrnent unexercised 
Litiga! yield, agencies, but the court one does not overlying 
ed although safe only against under manage impose rights as 
cases yield is not non- narrowly ment restrictions prior and 
quantified. stipulating defined area) paramount, 
This parties. Public conditions of without 
effectively agencies "severe water placing 
allows waived right shortage." limits. 
overlyers to to claim Conditions 
continue to prescription vary across 
pump without against future the three 
restriction. pumpingof Management 
stipulating Areas, but 




Antelope Prescriptive ldentified Establishes 
Valley rights awarded small a .. non-
to public pumpers pumper" 
agencies granted 1.2 class. New 
against certain AFY, but uses require 
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A. Group I Settled Cases.
Borden of Tradlng Exemption Treatment 





may purnp watennaster 
up to 3 AFY approval 
without and are 









We have grouped five cases together (Beaumont, Seaside, Santa 
Paula, San Jacinto, and Los Osos) not just because they were settled less 
contentiously, but also because they largely followed the same route to 
settlement - placing most or all mandatory burdens of pumping 
reductions on non-overlying water users and opting out of disputation of 
any prescription claims. Although the exact treatment of overlying and 
appropriative rights differs somewhat between the cases, all avoided any 
potential disputes about prescriptive rights or other priority issues 
between the two classes of rights holders by placing limited or no 
burdens on overlying pumpers. Most of settlements also included a 
trading mechanism to create at least the possibility of the purchase by 
municipalities of water and pumping rights used by overlying irrigators. 
Although these cases are of limited precedential value (unlike the 
litigated cases that rise up through the appellate courts ), it <loes appear 
that the adjudications borrow from each other presumably because 
their terms are well known in the water law community in California. 
l. Beaumont
Toe Beaumont basin is in Riverside County in the Inland Empire 
area east of Los Angeles. The stipulated judgment in the Beaumont 
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basin adjudication is similar to the four other stipulations discussed 
below in that it places the burden of reductions on appropriative 
pumpers. However, it <loes so for a different purpose in a different 
context. The stipulation allocates the entire safe yield to the seventeen 
principal overlying pumpers in the basin, but also allowed appropriators 
to pump for ten years under a so-called "temporary surplus" so as to 
draw down the aquifer and free up storage space. 97 This allowed 
municipal growth to continue and created space for municipalities and 
water agencies to store imported water, carryover rights, and other 
developed water. 
a. Context
During the late 1990s, municipalities in the Beaumont Basin 
experienced very rapid growth. 98 Although the basin was not in 
overdraft, the rate of municipal growth created water management 
challenges. Toe municipalities hoped to meet growing water demand 
from a number of sources, including imported water. They lacked both 
space to store that water  from year to year, and a legal framework for 
doing so. A group of municipalities began to negotiate a water 
management plan in 2002 and filed a collaborative adjudication in 2003. 
Toe court entered a stipulated judgment in 2004, a remarkably rapid 
resolution. 99 Toe settlement included seventeen overlying pumpers and 
five appropriative users (two cities, two water districts, and one water 
company). 
b. Water rights
Toe stipulation granted the entire safe yield, initially calculated at 
8,650 AFY, to overlying pumpers. Each pumper's allocation was based 
on their maximum production during the 1997-2001 time-frame. A 
pumper is allowed to pump five times their allocation in any five-year 
period, allowing significant flexibility from year to year. 100 Toe penalty 
for exceeding that limit is a replenishment assessment. Overlying 
owners can sell their allocations to other overlying owners or to 
97. The pumping of a so callcd "temporary surplus" in ordcr to free up storage space for
future use can be considered pumping within the safc yield evcn though it draws clown aquifcr 
levels. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d al 280. 
98. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, al 173-74.
99. /d. al 174.
100. BEAUMONT BASIN WATERMASTER, First ANN. REP. OF THE BEAUMONT BASfN 
WATERMASTER 1, 5 (2004). 
220 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:185 
appropriators.101 Indeed, the allocations were established so that 
overlying rights could be easily converted to appropriative rights as land 
was developed. 102 
Toe judgment allocated none of the safe yield to appropriative 
pumpers. Rather, the judgment created a 160,000 AF "temporary 
surplus," and allocated it to the appropriators to draw down over the 
nine-year period following the judgment.
103 
Due to the absence of overdraft, prescription and its related 
complexities were not really at issue in the case. The municipal water 
suppliers made the decision to deal with water supply stress in advance 
of a crisis. Given the relatively low level of pumping compared to safe 
yield, it appears there was surplus available for appropriation, and those 
suppliers did give up their potential claims to that surplus in order to 
facilitate their preferred physical solution. Under Katz however, those 
claims would have evaporated once the basin went into overdraft. The 
key to the stipulation and physical solution is the use of groundwater 
storage to stabilize the short-term fluctuations in the availability of 
surface water. Since the judgment was issued in 2004, the total amount 
of water stored by appropriators in the basin has increased from about 
4,000 AF to nearly 100,000 AF in 2015. 104 Although this strategy has 
considerable benefits for groundwater levels and storage, it is vulnerable 
· to potential long-term declines in the availability of imported surface
water on which the appropriators have relied while reducing their
pumping. i os
2. Seaside Basin
The Seaside basin is on the Monterey Península and faces the threat 
of saltwater intrusion driven by pumping by both municipalities and 
irrigators. The case took a bit less than three years to resolve through a 
stipulated judgment entered by the trial court in 2006. This was followed 
by an appeal by two parties, which was completed a year later in 
2007. 106 The resolution of this difficult dispute involved several 
innovative management tools, and its treatment of property rights 
101. Id. at 3 8.
102. lnterview 1, supra note 55.
103. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 176.
104. BEAUMONTBASIN WATERMASTER, 2015 ANN. REP. DRFT. 1 1, tbl.3-9, 3 46 (2016).
105. Debra Perronc & Melissa Mcrri Rohde, Benefits and Economic Costs of Managed
Aquifer Recharge in California, 14 S.F. EsTUARY & WATERSHED SCI. 1, 1 (2016). 
106. Thc ordcr proposed by stipulating partics was opposcd by two other partics. Toe tria]
court adopted thc stipulation in part aftcr a tria] in thc case. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 227. 
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sidestepped the litigation difficulties set up by Mojave and its 
predecessors. 
a. Context
The Seaside adjudication took place against a backdrop of severe 
water shortages on the Monterey Peninsula, including overdraft of the 
Seaside basin. The region faced an ongoing shortfall due to a State 
Water Resources Control Board ruling in 1995 regarding surface water 
rights in the Carmel River. 107 Overdraft of the Seaside basin created a 
risk of seawater intrusion, and pumping reductions were needed in order 
to protect the basin from that risk. Because of the basin's limited yield, 
the degree of overdraft had grown acute even though the number of 
pumpers and their total production were small. 108 The region had no 
access to imported water or other surface water, increasing the pressure 
on the groundwater basin and limiting management options. At the time 
of the adjudication, the community was developing several new sources 
of water, including aggressive conservation, desalination, aquifer 
recharge, and wastewater recycling. Water use in the basin is primarily 
urban, and the total number of parties, 16, was relatively small. The key 
parties got together to negotiate before filing an adjudication, and 
essentially developed the settlement before filing the case. 109 The 
purpose of filing was to improve legal resilience by establishing a clear 
and transparent set of rules and a governance structure that all parties 
could agree on for moving forward. 110 
b. Water rights
Toe strategy of the parties was not to start with the legal framework 
for water rights, but rather to find a practica! management approach that 
would work to get the basin to safe yield and that all users would agree 
to, and then to fit that approach into the legal framework. The basic 
approach, in the words of one attorney involved, was to first assess the 
amount of water available, and then find the best tools for sharing that 
107. California State Water Resources Control Board Order 95 10 (1995). Cal. Am. Water
Co., CAL. WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Order No. WR 95 1 O (July 6, 1995). 
108. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 228.
109. See general/y id. at 226; California American Water v. Seaside et al., (Monterey Co.
Superior Ct., Case No. M66343, February 9, 2007). Cal. Am. Water v. Seaside et al., No. M66343 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2010). 
110. Intervicw with attomcy involved in the Scaside and Santa Paula adjudications (name
on file with authors), (Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter lnterview 2]. 
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water.111 
In the end, the case was settled by giving overlying pumpers priority 
despite potential claims of prescription. The judgment made a broad 
brush finding of mutual prescription, gave each pumper an initial 
allocation based on its historie pumping, and created two categories of 
pumping allocations.112 Overlying pumpers were given an "Altemative 
Production Allocation" (AP A). Holders of AP As have a quantified right, 
but have no obligation to reduce their pumping unless other pumpers (as 
discussed below) reduce their pumping to zero and safe yield has still 
not been met. However, AP A holders do not enjoy sorne other benefits, 
such as the right to transfer their AP A, to use it on another property, or 
to use it to establish carryover credits or storage rights. Appropriators 
were given Standard Production Allowances (SPAs). In contrast to the 
overlying pumpers, these producers are subject to a step-down 
requirement to reduce pumping over time in order to bring overall 
production within safe yield.113 Only if these pumpers reduce their 
production to zero, and if these reductions are not adequate to achieve 
safe yield, do the overlying holders of AP As have to begin to reduce 
their pumping. 114 Holders of SPAs, however, do benefit from the ability 
to manage their rights more flexibly by accumulating carryover credits, 
changing the place of use, owning and using storage rights, and 
transferring their allocations. 115 Overlying pumpers, including holders 
of AP As, were given the option of converting their AP As into SP As, the 
primary benefit of which would be to give them the opportunity to sell 
their allocations. 
The judgment thus finessed several aspects of the black letter of. 
groundwater rights announced in City of Pasadena, City of San 
Fernando, and Mojave. First, it used mutual prescription to set initial 
allowances, but did not take the doctrine's next step by making 
reduction requirements uniform. Indeed, it gave overlying pumpers 
priority access to the full safe yield over appropriators, a situation that 
the deployment of mutual prescription had been used by courts and 
settling parties to avoid. The stipulation thus gave overlying owners 
much more advantageous treatment than they would have received had 
111. Id.
112. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 229.
113. The reduetions are quite steep (ten pereent a ycar, starting three ycars after the
judgement), as are the penaltics for exeeeding an SPA ($2,872 per aere/foot in 2017). Cal. Am. 
Water v. Seaside et al., No. M66343 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. !, 2010); SEASIDE BASIN 
WATERMASTER, SEASIDE BASIN WATERMASTER ANN. REP. 7 (2017). 
114. Cal. Am. Water, No. M66343, at 20.
115. Id. at 5.
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the urban water providers successfully litigated any prescription claims 
or had the case been settled using the pre-San Fernando method of 
universal mutual prescription. They also received better treatment than 
they would have using the equitable apportionment theory of the Mojave 
settlement. The appropriators, primarily urban water providers, were 
willing to accept this as a pathway to implementing a water management 
strategy that worked for them. Among other management tools, the 
settlement set up a market with clear rules, rules that favored the 
overlying pumpers, while allowing all parties to avoid the high 
transaction costs that would have been necessary to assert any 
prescriptive rights. 
The terms of the judgment have not been sufficient to foster much of 
a market in water rights in the basin. Only an insignificant quantity of 
AP As have been con verted to SP As, and trading has been minimal. 116
For the time being, community efforts have focused on developing 
additional water supplies, primarily through water recycling and 
desalination. 
3. Santa Paula
Toe Santa Paula Basin is located in Ventura County, north of Los 
Angeles. The trial court initially entered a judgment in the Santa Paula 
basin adjudication in 1996, and then amended its judgment in 2010. 
Although the original judgment predates Mojave, we have included the 
case here because the currently operative judgment postdates it. The 
Santa Paula judgment adopted similar approach to water rights and 
allocations as Seaside in giving every pumper a quantified allocation, 
but it saddles appropriators with most of the burden for ramping down 
use to achieve safe yield. 
a. Context
The Santa Paula Basin was ripe for potential water disputes. It faced 
conflicting demands from municipal and agricultura! users. In addition, 
parties faced a great deal of uncertainty about the basin, including 
estimates of safe yield. Although they were not sure the basin was in 
overdraft, overlying landowners brought the adjudication in 1991 in 
order to cut off any potential prescription claims by the City of San 
Buenaventura, the only significant appropriative user. 117 This initial 
SEASIDE BAS!N WATERMASTER, supra note 113, at 5. 
117. The City of Santa Paula is also a party to thc judgment, but as a mcmber of the Santa
Paula Basin Pumpcrs Association. The judgment <loes not spccify whcthcr as a city, Santa Paula is 
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filing was brought to judgment in 1996. The parties went back to the 
court in 2010 to seek an amendment to the judgment that would clarify 
pumping rights in order to spark more trading of groundwater rights. 
b. Water rights
The 2010 judgment, by its own terms, states that it "is not a 
determination of water rights." Legally, the remedy in the judgment 
constitutes a physical solution rather than a determination of such 
rights.118 Under Mojave, such physical solutions cannot, however, 
"wholly disregard" or "simply ignore" property rights priorities. The 
judgment in Santa Paula adds sorne practical specificity to that standard. 
Toe judgment gives overlying pumpers considerable preference, 
certainly more preference than their brethren · in the Mojave basin. 
However, this preference is not as absolute as that given overlying 
pumpers by the Seaside adjudication. Toe overlying pumpers that were 
part of the judgment all became members of the Santa Paula Basin 
Pumpers Association (SPBPA). The SPBPA was allocated the overlying 
pumpers' share of the safe yield. In tum, each SPBP A member holds an 
Individual Pumping Allocation (IP A), which is their portion of that 
overall share. Each IP A administered by the SPBP A is evaluated on a 7-
year running average. So, each member must remain within his/her 
allocation on average, but has flexibility to vary their pumping from year 
to year. According to· one lawyer, one key to the settlement was the 
SPBPA's role in holding the overall overlying allocation in trust and 
then divvying it up among individual pumpers based on historical use. 
The fact that farmers had to share with each other how much water they 
were using created big incentives for efficiency. "Toe farmers had to 
prove up their rights ... not to the city, but to each other. The drive for 
efficiency that occurred in this area is remarkable ... you're talking about 
90% efficiency in irrigation."119 The incentive to maximize estimates to 
pumping to increase one's share was apparently balanced by the desire 
not to appear wasteful. 
The City of San Buenaventura, as the sole appropriator, was 
allocated three thousand acre/feet per year (slightly more than ten 
percent of overall pumping in the basin). While the judgment does not 
explicitly hold this right to be junior to the SPBP A rights, it creates a 
an appropriative uscr. Howcver, as a member of the Association, its obligations to cut back 
pumping are the same as overlying landowners. See United Water Conservation Dist. v. City of 
San Buenaventura, No. S226036, 7 22 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2017). 
118. Id. at 5. 
119. Interview 2, supra note 110.
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much more severe ramp down schedule at the point San Buenaventura 
must reduce its pumping to zero, SPBP A members must only reduce by 
ten percent. 120 This disparity in treatment is not as great as it might 
seem, because the three-thousand acre foot number greatly exceeds the 
city's historical pumping.121 The judgment thus gives the city 
considerable cushion; because ofthis cushion, the ramp down provisions 
have yet to kick in.122
The judgment sets up a very streamlined system for trading which 
had contributed to the establishment of a "very definite, identifiable 
water market" in the basin. 123 SPBPA members may transfer their 1P A, 
either annually or permanently. Toe only approval process is a 30-day 
notice to the watermaster to assess potential injury to the basin. 124 In the 
wake of the 201 O judgment, trading in the basin among SPBP A 
members, and between SPBP A members and the city, has increased. 
We can draw several irnportant lessons from the Santa Paula 
adjudication. First, the judgment provides at least one roadmap for 
implementing Mojave. The parties and the court created a physical 
solution that avoided litigating any form of prescription or definitivély 
determining the water rights of each party. The judgment placed burdens 
on both classes of pumpers. Although, if shortages became acute, the 
burden on the appropriator would be greater, that irnpact is mitigating by 
the relatively generous allocation and the potential to buy allocations 
from SPBP A members. Although we do not know how appellate courts 
might rule on this specific issue, it is an example of a physical solution 
that does not "sirnply ignore" priorities. Second, the adjudication 
demonstrates the irnportance of individually quantified allocations. The 
uncertainty about compliance with allocations by SPBA members had 
stalled trading. The market only began to play a role in water 
management once mandatory compliance with those allocations was 
120. United Water Conserva/ion District v. City of San Buenaventura, No. CVJ 1561, at
12-13.
121. The judgment determined historical use to be 1,141 AFY, but in 2013 and 2014 the
city only pumped 901 and 791 AF, respectivcly. Id. 
122. SANTA PAULA BASIN TECH. ADYISORY COMM., UN!TED WATER CONSERVATION
DIST., 2015 SANTA PAULA BASIN ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2015). 
123. One of the key reasons for the 201 O judgment amendment was that the initial
judgment did not makc clcar that SPBPA members had to stay within their individual alloeations; 
the amendmcnt helped facilitate trading. See Motion to Amend and Rcstate the Santa Paula Basin 
Judgment, Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 5 6, United Water Conservation Dist. v. 
City of San Buenaventura, No. CVI 1561 l .  See a/so id. at 201-04 
124. United Water Conservation District v. City of San Buenaventura, supra note 120, at 
17.
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clarified in 2010. 125
4. San Jacinto
[Vol. 37:185 
The San Jacinto Basin is located in Riverside County in southern 
California, bounded by mountains on the north and east. The court 
entered a stipulated judgment for the San Jacinto basin adjudication in 
2013. This settlement represents another example of appropriators 
assuming the entire burden of pumping reductions in order to facilitate a 
settlement. The judgment also sets up a market that overlying pumpers 
may opt into. 
a. Context
The San Jacinto basin had faced decades of conflict o ver both 
groundwater and surface water. Pumpers in the San Jacinto Basin, 
including irrigators, two municipal water districts, two cities, and an 
Indian Tribe, engaged in intensive efforts in the 20 years leading up to 
the stipulated judgment to develop a groundwater management plan to 
end long-term over pumping and clarify the tribe's water rights. 126 Safe 
yield was estimated at 40-45 thousand AFY, with an overdraft of 
approximately 10-15 thousand AFY. 127
Pumping in the basin is overwhelmingly by appropriators. In 2014, 
private landowners pumped just under 13,000 AF for overlying uses, 
and the Soboba tribe pumped 1,690 AF. Toe remainder of pumping was 
for non-overlying use by the four water agencies (the Eastem Municipal 
Water District, the Lake Hemet Municipal Water District, the City of 
San Jacinto, and the City of Hemet). 128 Water users in the basin have 
access to both State Water Project water (9,169 AF in 2014) and 
recycled water (12,196 AF in the same year). 129
b. Water rights
Again, this stipulated judgment places all of the burden of reductions 
on appropriative pumpers. This was both because the parties recognized 
the priority of overlying pumpers and appropriators were in large part 
responsible for the overdraft. In addition, the parties wanted to reach a 
fast settlement, and the best way of doing that was to leave the overlying 
125. Intcrvicw 7, supra note 92.
126. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 166 67.




pumpers alone. 130 
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The judgment provides private pumpers with options by creating 
multiple classes of overlying rights: 
Non-participants in the judgment can continue pumping as before, 
under state law, but cannot enter the judgment later. The Watermaster 
estimates their groundwater production for purposes of calculating safe 
yield and overdraft, but they are under no pumping limits pursuant to the 
judgment. 
Class A pumpers grant permission to install meters and monitor 
production. They have no limit on production. They cannot sell their 
water right. They have three years to decide whether to switch to Class 
B. 
Class B pumpers agree to generous pumping limits and to have 
meters installed to monitor production. They can sell their water rights, 
to each other or to appropriators.131
The judgment <loes not apply to "de minirnus" producers of less than 
twenty-five AFY, a quite generous threshold. This seemingly includes 
landowners who have not previously pumped and hold unexercised 
overlying rights. 132 
Toe allocations for the four appropriators were based on their 
average pumping during the 1995-1999 period.133 The judgment requires 
them to reduce pumping by ten percent during the first year of the 
judgment, and then by up to ten percent each year after that, as 
determined by the Watermaster. The goal of the ramp-down schedule is 
to achieve safe yield within six years of the judgment. 134 After the 
initial ten percent cutback, the Watermaster required seven percent 
reductions in years two and three. Only one more seven percent 
reduction beyond that is needed to achieve safe yield. 135
In the interest of expediency, and to avoid the quagmire of water 
rights priorities, the four appropriators in the San Jacinto adjudication 
decided to cede full priority to overlying holders. Several factors made 
this decision comparatively manageable. First, those pumpers controlled 
most of the production, making safe yield achievable with reductions 
130. Intervicw with staff of San Jacinto Watermaster, (name on file with authors), (Aug.
25, 2016) [hercinafter Intervicw 4]. 
131. E. Mun. Water Dist. v. City of Hemet, No. RIC1207274, at 17 20 (Riversidc Cty.
Super. Ct. Apr. ]8, 2013) (stipulatcdjudgment). 
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Intcrview 4, supra note 130.
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only by them. Second, the level of overdraft was fairly manageable (10-
15 thousand AFY, with a safe yield of approximately 40-45 thousand 
AFY). Third, the appropriators were able to reduce demand through 
conservation and had readier access to alternative sources such as treated 
wastewater and imported supplies. Finally, the judgment set up a water 
market to create more flexibility for all parties, although recent annual 
reports do not reveal that any trades have yet taken place. 136 
5. Los Osos
The Los Osos basin is a small coastal aquifer in San Luis Obispo . 
county, and serves as the sole water supply for the unincorporated 
community of Los Osos. 137 In the Los Osos basin, groundwater 
production was predominantly 60% appropriative pumping by 
municipal water purveyors. The adjudication ultimately settled in 2015 
because those appropriators were willing to forgo any claims of 
prescription and allow overlying pumping to continue without regulation 
or any demand management. The appropriators were able to achieve 
safe yield by aggressive urban water conservation, including a waste 
water recycling plant. 
a. Context
Seawater intrusion and water quality problems due to septic system 
discharges have been a concern in the basin since the  l 970s; the state 
imposed a prohibition against new septic system discharges in 1988, 
resulting, in effect, in a building moratorium. 138 Continued pumping of 
the lower aquifer created a significant risk of seawater intrusion. An 
adjudication was filed in 2004 and settled with a stipulated judgment in 
2015. 139 Three municipal water purveyors constituted 60% of the water 
pumping. Those pumpers were faced with a decision whether to attempt 
to assert a claim of prescription against the overlying pumpers. 
Ultimately, they concluded that they could reduce their own water use 
enough through an aggressive efficiency program that included a water 
136. EASTERN MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, HEMET/SAN JACINTO ÜROUNDWATER 
MANAGEMENT AREA 2015 ANNuAL REPORT (2016). 
137. LOS Osos CMTY. SERYICES DIST. ET AL., UPDATED BASIN PLAN FOR THE LOS Osos
GROUNDWATER BASIN 1 (2015). 
138. Id. at 81 82.
139. We have included it in the group afeases that scttlcd "quickly" because most ofthat
time was not spent in active litigation. Rather, the case was stalled far a significan! period oftime 
due to political disputes within one ofthe water agencies, and to develop a basin managcmcnt plan 
after an intcrlocutory judgment. We could havc put this case in eithcr group, but ultimatcly it 
sharcd far more in common with thc othcr four cases that scttled much more quickly. 
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recycling plant, and that they would need additional tax revenue to 
accomplish that from all the landowners in the basin. 140 They decided 
that they could achieve their goals without a traditional water rights 
determination. 
b. Water rights
As with our previous four cases, a key aspect of the settlement was 
that the appropriators took on the burden of all reductions needed to 
achieve safe yield. The judgment found that "those with overlying rights 
take precedence in the absence of prescription."141 The judgment did not 
quantify overlying rights at all or place any restrictions on them. Rather 
it merely accounted for their water use in three of the four "water 
entitlement pools" created in the judgment. The judgment allocated forty 
percent of the basin's safe yield to the "Agricultura!," "Prívate 
Domestic," and "Community" pools, and determined that absent sorne 
future court action, users in those pools would be "unaffected by this 
Stipulated Judgment."142 These users do not have to reduce pumping or 
meter their wells. Their use is estimated through aerial photographs and 
land use changes. 143
The remaining 60% of the safe yield was allocated to the three 
appropriators in the "Purveyor Pool." Under the judgment, the three 
appropriators in the "Purveyor Pool" must achieve all reductions needed 
to reach safe yield, but with a different approach than in the other cases 
we have analyzed. The judgment does not allocate specific quantities to 
each pumper. Rather, the three purveyors must ensure that they achieve 
a per capita water use target of 50 gallons per day. 144 A key strategy for 
achieving this goal is the construction of a water recycling plant. These 
pumpers must report their groundwater production annually to the Basin 
Management Committee. 145
The Los Osos judgment is different from the previous four we have 
examined in a variety of respects. For example, it does not allocate 
specific quantities even to the individual appropriators, and it does not 
create the conditions for trading. However, it shares the characteristic 
140. Intervicw 5, supra note 96.
141. Los Osos Cmty. Services Dist. v. Go/den State Water Co., No. CV 040126, at 7 (San
Luis Obispo Cty. Super. Ct. Oct. 14 2015) (stipulatedjudgment). 
142. Id. at 16 17.
143. CLEATH HARRIS GEOLOGISTS & W ALLACE GROUP, Los Osos BASIN PLAN
GROUNDWATER MONJTORING PROGRAM 2015 ANNUAL MONITORING REPORT 9 (2016). 
144. Los Osos, No. CV 040126, at 12.
145. Id. at 16.
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that the municipal providers chose to avoid litigating prescriptive rights 
and to implement their chosen water management strategy through a 
physical solution instead. They complied with Mojave and its 
predecessors by placing no burdens at all on overlying pumpers. 
It is not clear whether the stipulated judgment will be durable. The 
purveyors have built their recycling plant and have stayed within the 
amount allocated to their pool. 146 However, water is not metered for the
other three pools, and the estimates for pumping are exactly the same for 
each year, except for a smaH variation for the agricultura! pool (made 
based on changes in land use observed through aerial photographs). This 
water-non-metered and produced by entities that are not parties to the 
judgment-is now 50% of the water in the basin.
147 At sorne point in the
future, increased water demand could put a strain on the structure of the 
judgment. 
B. Group JI: Litigated Adjudications
Two of the adjudications finalized after Mojave only reached final
judgment after extensive litigation: Santa Maria (judgment in 2008 after 
fifteen years of litigation, including a failed appeal) and Antelope Valley 
(judgment in 2015 after sixteen years of litigation). Both involved far 
more parties than the five cases discussed above, and significant 
disputation about prescription and other aspects of prioritization and 
quantification of pumping rights. The two cases demonstrate the 
difficulty in efficiently concluding groundwater disputes in complex 
settings while litigating under the Mojave framework. 
l. Santa Maria
Santa Maria is as responsible as any other case for giving California 
groundwater adjudications a bad name. Toe Santa Maria basin is a large 
coastal basin in southern San Luis Obispo County and northern Santa 
Barbara County. The case took fifteen years to reach judgment (eleven 
years of active litigation, another four for pursuit of a failed appeal). It 
involved 1,000 parties and cost over $11 million. 148 Despite this effort,
in the end the judgment did not determine safe yield, resolve most 
claims of prescription, or quantify rights (with a few small exceptions). 
146. lnterview 5, supra note 96; CLEATH HARRIS GEOLOGISTS, supra note 143, at 35, 73;
Los Osos, No. CV 040126, at 15. 
147. Id. at l.
148. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 238.
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a. Context
Water use in Santa Maria basin includes extensive agricultural 
production and a number of cities. The basin experienced significant 
overdraft through much of the 20th century, but the rate of overdraft 
declined significantly during the 1960s once area water users began 
importing water from the State Water Project and storing it in two 
reservoirs (Twitchell and Lopez). 149 Since then, groundwater levels in 
the basin have remained relatively stable. 150 Much of the dispute 
regarding overdraft was driven by overlying parties aggressively 
resisting claims of prescription by municipal water purveyors and 
seeking to have the quantity and priority of their rights confümed.151
Toe Santa Maria Water Conservation District originally filed the case in 
1997 to adjudícate rights in the basin not because it was in overdraft, but 
out of concerns of future shortages caused by a combination of aging 
storage infrastructure and growth in demand. 152 Ultimately, more than 
1,000 parties were ser�ed. The public water purveyors reached a 
settlement with most of the overlying landowners and filed a stipulation 
in 2005. The stipulation did not quantify water rights, but did include a 
physical solution that resolved disputes about rights to basin storage, 
imported water return flows, repairs to Twitchell, and other issues. 
Approximately seventy overlying pumpers did not sign the stipulation, 
and the court tried their claims beginning in 2005. According to one 
attorney involved in the case, the overlying pumpers were "vigilant in · 
guarding against prescriptive rights," and sought to have the 
appropriators "turn off their purnps befare [the overlying pumpers] have 
to reduce one iota."153 
One of the primary issues in dispute throughout the case was the 
extent, timing, and knowledge of overdraft, in arder to resolve 
prescription claims by the purveyors against overlying landowners under 
the criteria set out in the San Fernando decision. The trial court entered 
a judgment approving the stipulation in 2008. The trial court generally 
ruled for the public agencies with respect to rights to imported water 
return flows and recharge due to Twitchell. The trial court also held that 
the public agencies had acquired prescriptive rights during the period of 
overdraft, that those rights had not been extinguished by the passage of 
time, and that those rights should be enforced against the litigating 
149. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 211 Cal. App. 4th 266,276, 280 282 (2012).
150. Id at 281; LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 237.
151. lntcrview 1, supra note 55.
152. City of Santa Maria, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 276.
153. lntcrview 1, supra note 55.
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landowners, but not the stipulating ones. The objecting landowners 
appealed the judgment, and in 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment. 154 
b. Water rights
As noted above, the stipulation did not quantify individual water 
rights. However, it did include a finding that overlying rights were 
"prior and paramount," and allocated all of the safe yield to overlying 
rights holders. 155 This was possible largely because the public 
purveyors' needs were satisfied by the other elements of the physical 
solution, including an agreement for maintenance on Twitchell reservoir 
that would free up more imported water for use. The stipulation places 
very few burdeos on overlying owners, such as monitoring of 
groundwater elevations (but not well metering). The stipulation does 
allow for sorne cutbacks in pumping by all stipulating parties in the 
event of a declaration of a "severe water shortage," but the conditions 
for this are narrowly defined. 156 The purveyors waived past and future 
prescription claims against the settling overlying owners. 157 
Once the case went to trial, the stipulating parties were acutely 
aware that the objecting parties were likely to appeal. 158 As a result, the 
public purveyors sought to prove every potential element of their 
stipulation claims against the objecting parties to avoid a similar reversa! 
experienced in Mojave. The trial court had to resolve three significant 
disputes between the purveyors and the nonsettling landowners: first, 
whether the purveyors had acquired prescriptive rights against sorne of 
the landowners during a past period of overdraft, even in the absence of 
evidence of permanent overdraft; second, whether the court had power 
to order a physical solution in the absence of evidence of current 
overdraft; and third, who had rights to retum flows and recharge 
attributable to imported and developed water. 159
154. City of Santa Maria, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 277.
155. Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Santa Maria, Nos. 990738
and 990739, at 7 (San Luis Obispo Cty. Super. Ct. Junc 30, 2005) (stipulation). 
·156. Thcse conditions vary across the threc management arcas · cstablished in this
adjudication. For example, in the Santa Maria Valley Management Arca, conditions includc a 
chronic decline in groundwater levels ovcr at leas! five years, monitoring wells being bclow 
historie lcvels, and cvidencc that thc decline is due to incrcased pumping rather than drought .  Id.
at 16. 
157. Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation Dist., supra note 155, at 7.
158. Intcrview with attomey involvcd in thc Mojave, Santa Maria, and Antelope Valley
adjudications (name on file with authors), (Aug. 23, 2016) [hercinafter Interview 3). 
159. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 240; City ofSanta Maria, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 277.
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The trial court, affirmed by the court of appeals, ruled for the 
purveyors on all of these issues, including granting them prescriptive 
rights against certain landowners.160 With respect to water rights, 
however, the most significant lesson from the case is how the Mojave 
framework drove significant, expensive, and time-consuming litigation 
over relatively small amounts of water. The appropriative rights holders, 
all municipal water purveyors, were essentially willing to give priority 
to overlying pumpers and waive their prescriptive rights if they could 
resolve a variety of other water management issues, including reduced 
capacity in Twitchell reservoir, rights to storage, and rights to retum 
flows.161 The complexity ofthe context, however, made that avenue for 
settlement (which would have been consistent with Seaside, San Jacinto, 
Santa Paula, Beaumont, and Los Osos) far more difficult, and drove up 
transaction costs for a settlement. The need to litigate was in part driven 
by a community of landowners who were willing to fight to foreclose 
any possibility of a prescriptive right or limitations on their pumping 
rights. 162 Toe purveyors concluded that the only way to make the 
settlement hold up was to fully litigate the issues related to prescription 
and priority, in large part because of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Mojave: 
Toe result of Mojave is you think it's got to hold up under strict 
court appeal scrutiny ... There were people who did not want us to put 
on the full blown water rights case . . . [ we said] we are absolutely 
putting on the full-blown case, because this is going up on appeal. It's a 
big deal to tell an overlying pumper you have to pay to pump, or you 
might not be able to pump. We're going to show all the elements of 
prescription were met and what the pumping numbers were . . . we 
wouldn't be going through all that if it wasn't for the Mojave 
decision.163 
Both attomeys interviewed in connection with the Santa Maria 
adjudication expressed the view that the expensive litigation strategy 
was driven by the view that Mojave required quantification of overlying 
rights and of overdraft before a court could rule on prescriptive rights.164 
Toe difficulties with both litigation and dispute resolution related to 
the more complex nature of water use in the basin, the number of 
160. LANGRIDGE, supra note 19, at 240.
161. Interview 1, supra note 55.
162. Interview 1, supra note 55.
163. Interview 3, supra note 158. See a/so lnterview 1, supra note 55 (noting "vigilance"
ofnon settling partics in "guarding against" prcscriptive rights). 
164. Interview 1, supra note 55; Interview 3, supra note 158.
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pumpers, and the property rights regime; this combination of factors led 
not only to expensive and lengthy litigation, but also a resolution of 
questionable durability. A great <leal of uncertainty surrounds the future 
of the Santa Maria basin. Overlying landowners can continue to pump, 
without metering and without restriction under normal circumstanc(:s. 165
Their pumping is limited only in the event of a "severe water shortage," 
and then only mildly. For example, in the Nipomo Mesa Management 
Area, · overlying owners could be restricted to "110% of the highest 
pooled amount previously collectively used by those Stipulating Parties 
in a Year." 166 Even these restrictions leave open the question of how 
these requirements would be imposed on a pool of users, when there is 
no metering or quantification of rights for individual users. The failure 
to quantify individual rights also makes it extremely difficult to transfer 
rights from overlying pumpers to appropriators as demand shifts to 
. municipal use. Presumably, parties to such a transaction would have to 
do the technical work needed to quantify the right at that point. Finally, 
the security of the water supply of the purveyors/appropriators depends 
heavily on imported water. That supply is likely to be more uncertain in 
the future. The sustainability of water supply in the basin generally, and 
of management of the aquifer, would be jeopardized by increasing 
demand and a prolonged drought. 
Toe adjudication both incurred high transaction costs and set up a 
framework where transaction costs would still be high if any meaningful 
adjustment in water allocation or management is needed due to 
increased demand, decreased surface water availability, or other changed 
circumstances. This problematic resolution was driven by at least three 
factors: the Mojave decision, the complexity of the basin, and the 
litigious approach of sorne of the parties. In sorne ways, this may be a 
more meaningful revelation of implications of Mojave. The parties in the 
five cases discussed in the previous section essentially bypassed the 
Mojave framework by giving up their prescriptive rights and set up a 
sy�tem that would make future reallocations of water more efficient. 
That option was not available to the parties in the Santa Maria basin, 
both because of the extent of overlying use and the approach of the 
litigants. The result was an expensive case that may have put off a 
variety of difficult issues for the future. 
165. Santa Maria Va/ley Water Conservation Dist., supra note 155, at 8-11; Intcrvicw 1,
supra note 55. 
166. Santa Maria Va/ley Water Conserva/ion Dist ., supra note 155, at 25 26.
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2. Antelope Valley
Toe Antelope Valley basin underlies more than a thousand square 
miles of the western Mojave Desert in portions of Los Angeles, San 
Bernardino, and Kern counties. The Antelope Valley basin adjudication 
was first filed in 1999 and did not reach final judgment until 2015. That 
judgment is currently on appeal. Antelope Valley has been described as 
the largest groundwater adjudication in Califomia's history, and 
potentially in United States history, involving over 70,000 parties when 
the non-pumper class is included.167 In addition to its size, the presence 
of significant agricultura! and municipal water uses made it ripe for 
litigation. 
a. Context
The Antelope Valley basin is subject to pumping by a variety of 
municipal water providers and agricultura! producers. 4,000 specific 
pumpers were named in the adjudication. An additional 70,000 non­
pumping landowners and more than 3,000 small pumpers were added 
via a class action. 168 Many of the agricultura! pumpers are corporate 
producers with significant financia! resources.169 As an additional 
complicating factor, the basin is home to Edwards Air Force Base, and 
the United States government is a significant pumper. The United States 
waived its sovereign immunity to participate in the litigation, but its 
participation meant that the adjudication had to be comprehensive to 
comply with the terms ofthe McCarran Amendment.170
Groundwater use in the basin is primarily for irrigated agriculture. 
Of the adjusted native safe yield of 70,686 AFY (which excludes rights 
allocated to small pumpers, the federal government, and the state of 
California), the judgment allocated a total of 58,322 AFY to 104 
overlying producers, virtually all ofwhom were irrigators. 
Although sorne parties disputed the extent of overdraft, 171 the court 
167. Antelope Va/ley Groundwater Adjudication &ttles, BEST, BEST, AND KRIEGER (Jan.
21, 2016), https://www.bbklaw.com/news-events/ncws-room/2016 (1)/client
s ucccsscs/0 1 /ante lopc va l ley ground water adjudica ti on set ti es. 
168. id.
169. For example, the case was initially brought by Diamond Farming Company, a large
almond producer. ln 2001, the case was joined by Bolthouse Farms, a large carrot farming 
company. 
170. 43 U.S.C. § 666. Undcr thc McCarran Amendmcnt, a case must be a comprchcnsive
adjudication of ali claims to a gi�cn sourcc of water in order to effect jurisdiction ovcr thc Unitcd 
States in state court. Statcmcnt of Dccision at 2, Antelope Va/ley Groundwater Cases, (L.A. Cty. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015). 
171. Statcment of Decision Phase 11[ Tria! at 3, Antelope Va/ley Groundwater Cases, (L.A.
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found that "[r]eliable estimates of the long-term extractions from the 
Basin have exceeded reliable estimates of the Basin's recharge by 
significant margins, and empirical evidence of overdraft in the Basin 
corroborates that conclusion. Portions of the aquifer have sustained a 
significant loss of Groundwater storage since 1951." 172 Indeed, the basin
has seen considerable land subsidence causing, among other impacts, 
cracks in the runway at Edwards Air Force Base, a factor which added 
urgency to the case. 173
b. Water rights
Toe judgment's treatment of water rights shares sorne elements with 
that in Mojave. The Antelope Valley judgment mandates a physical 
solution that "is a fair and reasonable allocation of Groundwater rights 
in the Basin after giving due consideration to water rights priorities and 
the mandate of Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution . . 
and ... is a remedy that gives due consideration to applicable common 
law rights and priorities to use basin water and storage space without 
substantially impairing such rights." 174 On the other hand, the judgment
also states that "all of the Production Rights established by this 
Judgment are of equal priority, except the Federal Reserved Water 
Right." 175 Toe assertion of prescriptive rights by appropriators,
combined with federal involvement and the need to comply with the 
McCarran Amendment, meant that all rights had to be quantified. 
Toe judgment quantified the rights of 104 overlying pumpers and 
eleven appropriators and allocated transferable "Production Rights " to 
them. All of these pumpers must reduce their pumping pursuant to the 
same seventeen-year ramp down schedule.176 In addition to those eleven
appropriators and 104 overlying pumpers with quantified, transferable 
rights subject to ramp-down, the judgment gave the numerous members 
of the "Small Pumper Class " non-transferable rights to pump 1.2 acre­
feet per year each, exempt from the ramp-down schedule. 
Perhaps the most controversia! aspect of the case, and one of the 
issues raised in the pending appeal, was the judgment' s treatment of 
Cty. Sup. Ct., July 13, 2011). 
172. Judgment, Exhibit A at 15, Antelope Va/ley Groundwater Cases (L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct.
Dcc. 23, 2015). 
173. lntcrview 3, supra note 158.
174. Judgmcnt at 7, Antelope Va/ley Groundwater Cases (L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct. Dcc. 23,
2015). 
175. Id. at 15.
176. Partics are not strictly forbidden from exceeding thcir allocation, but must pay a
rcplcnishment fec ofthey do so. 
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unexercised pumping rights. The "nonpumper" class consisted of 70,000 
landowners, certified as a class, that had not yet exercised their 
overlying pumping rights. The judgment forbids them from pumping 
unless they pay a replenishment fee. 177 Toe appeals court ruling in this 
case could help shed light on an important issue in groundwater law and 
management the extent to which unexercised overlying rights can be 
restricted or extinguished. 
The length of the Antelope Valley adjudication cannot be blamed on 
litigation over prescription to the same extent as in the Santa Maria case. 
A great <leal of the delay, rather, can be attributed to the need to join all 
pumpers and landowners, either individually or as a class, in order to 
make the adjudication comprehensive. 
One possible explanation for the settlement in Antelope Valley is the 
relative dominance of overlying pumpers. Appropriative pumping was a 
small enough portion of the overall pumping that it would have been 
impossible to achieve safe yield without cutbacks by the overlying 
pumpers. Indeed, reducing the appropriators to zero would not have 
significantly reduced the burden on the overlying pumpers. Allowing 
appropriators the same ramp down schedule, with the potential for 
buying and selling allocations, may have ultimately benefited many of 
the overlying pumpers. 
Of all of the seven post-Mojave adjudications, Antelope Valley most 
resembles the large basins in the San Joaquín Valley that will need 
significant changes in groundwater management under the Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). 178 Antelope Valley is a large 
basin, with predominantly agricultura! pumpers and a high level of 
overdraft, with land subsidence as one of the primary "undesirable 
results" 179 of the over pumping. The adjudication provides both good 
and bad news for these basins. The ultimate resolution of the case in the 
judgment was relatively simple (proportional drawdowns by all but very 
minor pumpers), although it was not easy to achieve. The case <lid not 
get hung up on litigation of prescriptive rights, but it <lid experience 
significant delays. Although sorne of the delays were due to the 
procedural complexity of the case, a great <leal of time was spent 
litigating the calculation of both safe yield, and the degree of overdraft. 
177. Judgment at 34, Antelope Va/ley Groundwater Cases (L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23,
2015). 
178. Thc San Joaquín Vallcy is ovcrdraftcd by an estimatcd 1.8 million acrc fcct pcr ycar.
See Hanak et al., Water Stress anda Changing San Joaquín Va/ley, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF 
CALIFORNIA, 2017, at 16. 
179. SGMA idcntifics six "undesirable rcsults," which must be avoidcd in order to
demonstrate sustainablc management. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10720(u) and (w). 
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Unfortunately, the sixteen years of litigation allowed many major 
pumpers to continue to pump at unabated or increasing levels, further 
exacerbating the overdraft. Interview evidence even suggests that 
arguments over the magnitude of safe yield were prolonged by sorne 
parties to enable them to keep pumping: 
... the dispute about safe yield is really driven by [large producers]. 
lt was really, I believe, simply about being able to pump . . . There 
[ were] settlement negotiations before I was involved for like six or 
seven years. Toen they filed the lawsuit and kept pumping, pumping, 
pumping, pumping. If you can argue about safe yield for ten years, you 
can pump for lift costs for ten years.18º 
The case <loes, however, point to a potential path forward for large, 
overdrafted basins parallel to the resolutions reached in the more easily 
settled cases. In Antelope Valley, it was clear that the primary burden of 
reducing overdraft would fall on the overlying irrigators--even severe 
cuts to the appropriators would not spare the overlying pumpers that 
burden. Under these circumstances, it may have been relatively painless 
to allocate production rights to the appropriators with proportional 
reductions that tracked those of the overlying pumpers. This reasoning 
in sorne ways parallels the five settled cases, but with the incentives 
flipped. In those cases, the municipal pumpers realized that the benefits 
of asserting prescriptive rights in an effort to shift sorne of the burden to 
the irrigators were simply not worth the cost, and instead they found a 
path for assuming the bulk of that burden. In Antelope Valley, 
appropriators did not have this option; instead, arguing for prescription 
was to their advantage, despite the risk of prompting a prolonged legal 
battle. 
The widely shared, proportional reductions deployed in Antelope 
Valley, of course, harken back to the settlement in Pasadena and those 
in adjudications settled during the time period between that case and San 
Fernando.181 A significant question for appellate courts in California 
will be whether the slightly tweaked rationale for that approach, along 
with a dense and detailed record, makes that approach more legally 
durable. 
V. THE FUTURE OF ADJUDICATIONS IN CALIFORNIA
Currently, groundwater management activities in California are 
dominated by the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014. 
180. Intervicw 3, supra note 158.
181. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29.
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Toe California legislature passed SGMA in 2014, during the third year 
of a drought that lasted from 2012 through 2016, in the context of 
rapidly accelerating groundwater overdraft. 182 It created a mandatory 
framework for sustainable groundwater management in California, the 
last western state to do so. 183 However, the statute by its own terms 
made clear that it was not disturbing the system of groundwater 
pumping rights in the state. Because the statutory scheme lies alongside 
the state's water rights law, SGMA <loes not foreclose the holders of 
groundwater rights from filing adjudications or other actions to enforce 
them. The interaction between SGMA and those property rights will be a 
critical factor in the new statute's success. In this section, we provide a 
brief summary of SGMA and assess the potential implications of related 
legislation seeking to streamline the adjudication process. We then apply 
lessons draw from the seven post-Mojave adjudications to explore 
whether conditions in unadjudicated basins now working to comply with 
SGMA lend themselves to sorne ofthe innovative sti-ategies employed in 
the five "settled cases" in Group I, or whether SGMA's implementation 
in certain basins could get bogged down in lengthy legal battles, similar 
to our two "adversaria! cases" in Group II. 
A. Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA)
SGMA creates a basic framework for groundwater management, 
setting the goal of achieving "sustainable management" of the state's 
most significant groundwater basins. This goal is somewhat different 
1 82. Toe Act consisted of three separate bilis passed in August of 2014: Senatc Bill 1168, 
Senatc Bill 1319, and Asscmbly Bill 1739. For an account of SGMA's passage and its context, see 
T. C. Leahy, Desperate Times Cal! for Sensible Measures: The Making of the California
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 GoLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 5 (2015).
183. Thc short account ofthe bill in this paper <loes not do justice to SGMA's significance
or to the blizzard of activity that has come with its implementation. Local agencies have engaged 
in a two year dance ofmusical chairs to decide which agencies, and how many ofthem, should be 
GSAs in cach basin. See generally E. Conrad et al., To consolidate or coordinate? Status of the 
formation of groundwater sustainability agencies in California, STANFORD WATER IN THE WEST 
PROGRAM (2016); E. Conrad et al., Diverse stakeholders create collaborative multi/evel basin 
governance for groundwater sustainabi/ity, 72 CALIFORNIA AGRIC. 1 (2018). DWR has cngagcd 
in a long sprint to meet various deadlines for regulations, Bcst Management Practices, and other 
guidelines required by SGMA. Agriculture producers have frcttcd over potential fallowing due to 
reduced groundwater availability under tbe ncw law. See, e.g., Chris Austin, Panel Discussion: 
lmplications of SGMA lmplementation: Growers' Perspectives, MAVEN'S NOTEBOOK (Apr. 13, 
2017), https://mavcnsnotcbook.com/2017 /04/13/implications of sgma implementation growers
pcrspcctivcs/; see a/so A. Mettler, Reducing Overdraft and Respecting Water Rights Under 
California's 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act: A View From the Kern County 
Farming Sector, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 239 (2016) (asscssing burdcns SGMA may 
imposc on irrigators in the southcm San Joaquín vallcy). 
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than the "safe yield" standard used by courts in adjudications. SOMA 
defines sustainable management as the avoidance of six different 
"un des irab le results:" 
"Chronic lowering of groundwater levels;" 
"Significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage;" 
"Significant and unreasonable seawater intrusion;" 
"Significant and unreasonable degraded water quality;" 
"Significant and unreasonable land subsidence that substantially 
interferes with surface land uses;" and 
"Depletions of interconnected surface water that have significant 
and unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficially uses of the surface 
water." 184
Toe statute's main provisions apply to groundwater basins that the 
California Department of Water Resources (DWR) has designated as 
either high or medium priority, 185 except for areas of these basins that 
have been previously adjudicated (as well as three areas where 
adjudication proceedings were underway in 2014, including Los Osos 
and Antelope Valley). 186 
SGMA grants most of the authority and responsibility for reaching 
sustainable management to local agencies, with sorne state oversight and 
the risk of imposition of state authority if the work of local agencies 
does not comply with the law. lt requires the designation of one or more 
Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (OSA) for unadjudicated areas of 
high and medium priority basins by June 30, 2017. 187 SOMA gives 
those agencies a variety of powers, including to assess pumping fees, to 
184. CAL. WATERCODE § 1072l (w)(l )-(6).
185. CAL. WATER CODE § 10722.4. DWR accomplishes thc dcsignations in a documcnt
known as "Bullctin 118," which both dclincatcs the boundarics of California groundwater basins 
and rcports on thcir status. As of2014, DWR had classified 127 groundwatcr basins in the statc as 
high or mcdium priority, accounting for an cstimated 96% of annual groundwatcr use in the state. 
See CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALlFORNlA'S GROUNDWATER, WORKING TOWARD 
SUSTAINABILITY, Bullctin 118 Interim Updatc (2016); CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA 
GROUNDWATER ELEV ATION MONITORING BASIN PRIORITIZATION PROCESS 4 (2014). 
186. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.8. Howevcr, an important wrinklc is that man y
adjudicated arcas do not cxactly match thc boundaries of designated high and medium priority 
basins. Arcas in these basins that are not part of the adjudication are still requircd to comply with 
SGMA's rcquirements to form GSAs and develop and implcment GSPs, as describcd herc. See 
CAL. WATER CODE § 5202(a). 
187. CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(aXl ). Existing entitics, such as local govemments and
water agencies, may serves as GSAs, as can new entitics, just as joint powers authorities. The 
number and typc of GSAs varíes considcrably from basin to basin, but more than 250 GSAs ha ve 
bcen dcsignatcd in 113 basins (thc rcmaining high and medium priority basins are covered by 
adjudications or altcmative plans). See E. Conrad et al., Diverse stakeholders create collaborative 
multilevel basin governance for groundwater sustainability, supra note 183, at 5. 
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regulate groundwater extractions, and to bring enforcement actions. 188
OSAs must, by 2020 for basins designated as critically overdrafted and 
2022 for the remaining basins, prepare and submit to DWR a 
groundwater sustainability plan (OSP) that brings the basin into 
sustainable management within twenty years. If DWR deems that OSAs 
in a basin have not demonstrated compliance, the State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB) may step in to develop and impose a basin 
plan, charging fees to do so. 189 
Although SOMA grants OSAs relatively extensive powers to 
regulate groundwater, SOMA also explicitly states that neither the 
statute, nor actions taken by OSAs or state agencies pursuant to the 
statute, change or determine water rights or their priorities. 190 As noted 
by one attomey deeply involved in adjudications and in SOMA 
implementation, this may seem contradictory. After all, if a OSA 
imposes new pumping limits or charges fees for extracting groundwater, 
this would seem to amount to a change in water rights, at least � a 
practica! sense. The implication, however, is that in negotiating the 
terms of a OSP, OSAs and relevant stakeholders will be assessing how 
their access to groundwater under the OSP will compare to the 
confirmed rights they might be able to obtain by pursuing an 
ad judication. 191 This makes the question of how ad judications will work 
188. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10735.2(a) and 10730.2. 
189. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10735.2(a) (criteria for declaration of a basin as 
"probationary") and 10735.8(a) (c) (SWRCB's authority to adopt and irnplement an "interirn 
plan" for probationary basins ). 
190. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.5(b) states that "[n]othing in this part, or in any
groundwater management plan adopted pursuant to this part, determines or alters ... groundwater 
rights under common law ... " To dispel any residual uncertainty, the statute repeats this 
admonition with respect to a variety of specific actions under SOMA. See CAL. WATER CODE § § 
10726.4(a)(2) (limitations on groundwater extractions imposed by OSA "shall not be construed to 
be a final determination of rights to extrae! groundwater from the basin or any portion of the 
basin"); 10726.8(b) (SOMA <loes not authorize local agencies to determine water rights); 
10735.8(i) (SWRCB authority to impose intcrim plan "<loes not alter the law cstablishing water 
rights priorities . . .  "). 
191. See R. McGlothlin, Will your basin adjudica/e, and if so, how will that relate to basin
management under SGMA?, CURRENT TRENOS IN WATER L. & PüL'Y (Novembcr 16, 2017), 
http://watcr.bhfs.com/will your basin adjudicate and-how will that relate to basin managemcnt
under sgma/. As a further comparison, we note that in sorne California basins that are managed by 
special districts, groundwatcr users ha ve been requested by thosc districts to reduce extractions in 
order to arres! declines in groundwater levels or to slow and attempt to reverse scawater intrusion, 
sometimes with the prospect of fecs assessed on pumping in exccss of the requested amounts. 
Thcse kinds of tcmporary reductions in pumping to address basin conditions have becn 
implcmcnted by sorne spccial districts without triggcring challcngcs rcgarding pumping rights, 
such as in the case ofürange County Water District. See BLOMQUIST, supra note 1, at 2 4 5  et seq.
This logic and practice may extend to basins that will be managed undcr SOMA, wherc an 
approvcd OSP might call for pumping reductions in ali or part of a basin in order to avoid or 
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after SGMA's passage a particularly critical one. 
As originally passed, SGMA was silent as to how its requirements 
should interact with the judicial branch in the event of adjudications of 
basins in the rnidst of SGMA irnplernentation. Indeed, SGMA could be 
quite vulnerable to adjudications or other litigation over property rights. 
Purnpers required by a GSP to reduce purnping could argue that such 
reductions would violate their property rights to pump. They could 
deploy a wide variety of argurnents to support that claim, all of which 
have potential to gurn up adrninistration of SGMA. First, they could 
claim that determination of purnping rights requires a determination of 
safe yield, which could delay, add to, or preernpt GSA efforts to asses 
"undesirable results." Second, they could argue that the GSP's 
reduction formula <loes not adequately integrate relative priorities of 
overlying and appropriative purnpers by, arnong other possibilities, 
allowing appropriators to continue purnping sorne share of the safe 
yield. Finally, landowners who do not currently purnp_ could argue that 
they have sorne future right to purnp. These claims could be asserted in 
an adjudication that sornehow parallels the SGMA process, or in a suit 
claiming that a GSP violates property rights to purnp groundwater. 
B. Legislation to Streamline Adjudications
Toe California legislature recognized this weakness, and only a year
after passage of SGMA enacted two bills intended both to streamline 
adjudications and, to the extent possible, to harmonize thern with the 
SGMA process. SB-226 and AB-1390, which amended the Water Code 
and the Code of Civil Procedure, included a range of procedural tweaks 
designed to streamline the adjudication process, particularly with respect 
to the process for serving, otherwise providing notice to, and joining all 
affected landowners in order to make conducting a comprehensive 
adjudication easier. 192 The bills also sought to lirnit the extent to which 
adjudications might conflict with the SGMA process, and to require 
courts to rnake their judgments consistent with GSPs to the extent the 
law of groundwater rights allowed. The heart of the intent of the 
legislation can be found at Water Code § 10737.2, which provides: 
mitigatc thc statutorily dcfincd undesirablc results or impose a fce on pumping abovc a ccrtain 
amount without neccssarily altering the status of the legal right posscssed by well owners. 
Howevcr, in sorne jurisdictions efforts to reduce pumping have triggcred litigation ovcr property 
rights. See R. Sabalow, Tensions, threats, as new California groundwater law takes shape, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Novembcr 21, 2015, http://www.sacbce.com/news/statc/califomia/water and
drought/articlc45802360.html (dcscribing litigation over ordinancc in San Luis Obispo County to 
limit groundwatcr pumping). 
192. See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 836.
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In an adjudication action for a basin required to have a groundwater 
sustainability plan under [SGMA], the court shall manage the 
proceedings in a manner that minimizes interference with the timely 
completion and implementation of a groundwater sustainability plan, 
avoids redundancy and unnecessary costs in the development of 
technical information and a physical solution, and is consistent with the 
attainment of sustainable groundwater management within the 
timeframes established by [SGMA]. 
This is bolstered by the substantive mandate that 
[t]he court shall not approve entry of judgment in an adjudication
action for a basin required to have a groundwater sustainability plan 
under this part unless the court fnds that the judgment will not 
substantially impair the ability of a groundwater sustainability agency, 
the board, or the department to comply with [SGMA] and to achieve 
sustainable groundwater management. 193
The bills echoed SGMA in disavowing any alteration · or 
determination of "groundwater rights under common law."
194 AB-1390, 
however, did indicate that courts, given the new procedures for making 
adjudications comprehensive, "may consider applying the principies 
established in In re Waters of Long Va/ley Creek Stream System (1979) 
25 Cal.3d 339,"195 presumably in order to limit unexercised overlying 
pumping rights. 
All of this leaves in place the property rights system analyzed in the 
first two sections of this article, including all the criteria for prescription 
claims and their accompanying uncertainty and expense. However, AB-
1390 specifcally does include a new procedure for adjudications that 
could profoundly affect their path to settlement. New § 850(a) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure gives the trial court in an adjudication authority 
to enter a stipulated judgment if the judgment meets three criteria: it is 
consistent with Section 2, Article X of the California Constitution, it is 
"consistent with the water rights priorities of all non-stipulating parties," 
193. CAL. WATER CODE § 10737.8. The bilis included a wide range of othcr provisions
designed to makc adjudication more consistent with rational and sustainable groundwater 
managemcnt, including that no pumping in a SGMA covered basin between 2015 and the 
finalization of a GSP can support a claim of prescription (CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.5(b)), that 
thc court has the power to cnter a preliminary injunction to limit pumping while the adjudication 
is pending (CAL. CODE OF crv. PROC. § 847), that the court has the power to stay the adjudication 
while the GSP development proccss is ongoing (CAL. CODE OF Crv. PROC. § 848), and that any 
suits challcnging a GSP must be coordinated or consolidatcd with any adjudication in thc basin 
(CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 838(d)). 
194. CAL. WATER CODE §10720.5(b). See a/so, CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 830(b)(7).
195. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 830(b )(7).
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and it treats objecting parties "equitably as compared to the stipulating 
parties." 196 Subsection (b) goes on to indicate that if the stipulating 
parties make up 50 percent ofthe pumpers in the basin and75 percent of 
the volume of groundwater pumped, the court may impose the judgment 
on an objecting party if the objecting party fails "to demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the proposed stipulated judgment does 
not satisfy one or more criteria described in subdivision (a) or that it 
substantially violates the water rights ofthe objecting party." 197 
This language seems directly targeted at claimants such as the 
Cardozo parties who objected to the stipulated judgment in Mojave and 
aspires to make it more difficult for objecting parties to derail 
settlements or exempt themselves from terms of settlements. This 
provision raises a string of questions that courts will have to answer 
before its true implications are known. The first is whether there is a 
difference between the Supreme Court's Mojave language, which 
refused to apply a stipulation to objecting parties noting that a physical 
solution cannot "simply ignore" or "wholly disregard" water rights 
priorities, and the language in the new law that a stipulation cannot be 
imposed on objecting parties if it "substantially violates" their property 
rights. In addition, the statute does not illuminate the difference between 
a mere violation and a "substantial" violation of property rights, or how 
to reconcile the language with the various provisions of SGMA that 
insist the legislation does not "alter" or "determine" property rights. 
AB-1390 and SB-226 accomplish important goals to both shorten 
adjudications and limit sources of disputation. For example, the 
legislation streamlines the process for making adjudications truly 
comprehensive, thereby empowering the court to deal with the problem 
of unexercised rights, potentially by subordinating them to currently 
exercised rights, pursuant to the fashion in which Long Va/ley Stream 
dealt with unexercised riparian rights to surface water. In addition, the 
provision of AB-1390 discussed above may provide sorne additional 
incentive to settle for parties who might otherwise contest an 
adjudication. Facing a stipulation joined by a majority of groundwater 
pumpers, and a supermajority of water use, such a pumper might prefer 
to negotiate for sorne concessions rather than have a less palatable 
stipulation imposed by the court. The extertt to which this section 
provides a true lever to promote settlement will depend in part on how 
courts resolve the questions outlined above. 
196. CAL. WATERCODE § 850(aX1) (3).
197. CAL. WATERCODE § 850(b).
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C. Lessons From Recent Adjudications in Light of SGMA
What does all of this mean for groundwater users in unadjudicated
basins, who are now faced with the challenge of complying with 
SOMA? As we have described, SOMA provides an opportunity for 
OSAs and interested parties to negotiate and agree upon a path to 
sustainability in the form of a OSP. The threat of state intervention if a 
OSP is not completed or is deemed inadequate provides an important 
incentive for working toward an agreement. However, SGMA and the 
subsequent legislation do not change the fundamental property rights 
system. If sorne parties remain unsatisfied with the OSP and believe they 
can obtain a better outcome through the courts, adjudication remains an 
altemative. The adjudications we analyzed in section III above provide 
sorne sense of the potential balance of incentives to litigate or to settle 
future cases. Do the experiences of these seven cases suggest that if 
adjudication is pursued, it is likely to be a lóng and drawn-out affair with 
high transaction costs? Which parties would be most likely to benefit 
from seeking an adjudication, and under what conditions? 
Neither SGMA nor the subsequent adjudication streamlining 
legislatión eliminates one of the main causes of litigation-driven delay in 
adjudications. By disclaiming any determination or alteration of 
property rights to pump groundwater, the new laws leave the door open 
for parties to fully litigate the thomy issue of prescription. As one pair of 
commentators (both of whom have been deeply involved in both SGMA 
implementation and a number of adjudications) noted, even though a 
judgment that tiered reductions in pumping or pumping fees in a way 
that tracked, even roughly, property rights priorities, would certainly 
satisfy Mojave, disputes "about whether prescriptive rights have 
developed . . . may persist among groundwater users or between the 
GSA and certain groundwater users." 198 
One general lesson from the seven cases is relative simple and 
unsurprising cases with small numbers of parties settle more quickly. 
One important reason for this is. that very complex litigation involving 
large numbers of parties is often slowed by logistics, such as those 
involved in serving notices and handling interventions. The provisions 
in AB-1390 will help with this cause of delay. Another potential reason 
is that the greater the number of parties at the table, the greater the odds 
that sorne of them will attempt to litigate prescription (for whatever 
motivation). As we have shown in our analysis of the two litigated cases 
(Santa Maria and Antelope Valley), arguments for prescription have 
198. See McGlothlin and Acos, supra note 8, at 125.
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.been an important factor in slowing down proceedings. SOMA and the 
new streamlining legislation will not change this dynamic. 
This brings us to a second set of lessons from the seven recent 
 adjudications, regarding the incentives of pumpers to litigate 
prescription and how those incentives might be managed. Six of the 
seven recent cases (all but Santa Maria) ultimately resolved claims of 
prescription. In four of the five cases that settled quickly ( omitting 
Beaumont, which was really about storage space and imported water) 
the municipal providers agreed to give up any claim of prescription and 
assume all ( or nearly all) of the burden of reductions to achieve safe 
yield. In all four basins, municipal use was a significant portion of 
groundwater pumping, meaning a significant portion of the burden of 
achieving safe yield would fall on them in any event. In addition, those 
municipal providers had avenues available to achieve reductions, 
including increased conservation and water recycling. Finally, three of 
the four stipulated judgments ( omitting Los Osos) included market 
mechanisms allowing municipal providers to purchase pumping rights in 
the event their needs exceed their available limits. This suggests that 
market mechanisms to shift water use as required reductions increase 
may be an important component of the path to settlement. 
However, our analysis indicates that parties determined to litigate 
prescription can continue to delay adjudications, even when fighting 
over relatively modest amounts of water. This is precisely what 
happened in Santa Maria. Although Antelope Valley ultimately settled 
without litigating prescription, the issues underlying prescription 
(primarily the extent and timing of overdraft) delayed the case. The 
streamlining legislation may reduce the economic incentive to delay, 
through the court's power to enter an injunction limiting pumping and 
the provision "freezing" the timeline for prescription after 2015. On the 
other hand, it may not reduce the ideological or longer-term incentives 
to litigate prescription. Our interviews with several lawyers indicated 
that a certain class of landowners are extremely motivated to litigate 
against claims of prescription by municipal pumpers 199 That motivation 
could be viewed in a variety of ways. From an economic perspective, 
those landowners may wish to maintain the flexibility to pump as much 
as they want, when they want, including to increase their pumping in the 
future should they plant crops that need more water or should their 
surface water supplies become less consistent. They may also wish to 
maximize the value of their water rights in order to sell them to 
199. lnterview !, supra note 55; lnterview 5, supra note 96.
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municipal providers in the context of water demand shifting from 
agricultural to municipal uses. From a more ideological perspective, 
they may simply wish to protect irrigators' rights during a time when 
agricultural uses of water are perceived to be under pressure from 
drought, urban growth, and increased government regulation. 
A closer look at these seven cases suggests that in basins dominated 
either by agricultural or by municipal uses, the incentives of overlying 
pumpers and of municipal pumpers to litigate prescription are 
diminished, especially in the post-Mojave environment. This is evident 
in Antelope Valley, where, despite the extensive litigation delays, the 
stipulation ultimately avoided prescription claims. Groundwater 
production in the basin was primarily agricultural irrigation on overlying 
lands. Irrigators could not avoid bearing the substantial burden of 
reductions, even if they defeated prescription claims by appropriators. 
They thus had no incentive not to enter into a stipulation with universal 
proportional reductions that mirrored the mutual prescription result of 
City of Pasadena, albeit only among the municipal parties. They chose 
to accept those reductions rather than litigating for the advantage they 
might gain by prevailing on prescription claims against the overlying 
pumpers. 
Finally, at least two of the cases (Beaumont with a final stipulation, 
Santa Maria with a stipulation that was litigated) settled based on 
expectations of imported water to satisfy future water demand. Given 
that climate change is likely to make droughts more severe, the future 
availability and reliability of imported water is in question. 200 This 
places even more pressure on groundwater users to make hard choices 
about reducing overall water use as they negotiate a path to sustainable 
management, and increases the potential for conflict. 
D. SGMA Implementation in the Post-Mojave Environment
Overall, our analysis suggests that two factors play a particularly key
role in determining the potential for extended conflict: the number of 
parties involved, and the likelihood that claims of prescription will hold 
up the process. The number of parties is likely to be highest in basins 
that cover a large land area, since there would tend to be a higher 
number of individual landowners ( except in basins where the federal 
government has significant land holdings). As noted above, prescription 
claims are most likely to be an issue when municipal and agricultura! 
200. Scc A. Schwarz, California Central Va/ley Water Rights in a Changing Climate, 13
San Francisco Estuary and Watcrshed Scicncc (2015) at l. 
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uses of groundwater are both important in an overdrafted basin. 
Toe conditions of the more than a hundred basins in the process of 
complying . with SGMA are diverse, making it difficult to 
comprehensively assess how these two factors play out across the state. 
However, Table 3 provides sorne indication for the twenty-one 
"critically overdrafted" basins, where GSAs are required to develop 
GSPs by 2020 instead of 2022, and where GSAs will face the most 
difficult choices. With the exception of Los Osos (which is already 
adjudicated) and Santa Cruz Mid-County, agricultura! production in 
these basins is significant with heavy reliance on groundwater, 
particularly across the Central Valley and Central Coast. 201 At the same 
time municipalities in many of these basins also depend substantially on 
groundwater. In fifteen of the twenty basins listed that are not yet 
adjudicated (leaving out Los Osos), cities rely on groundwater for at 
least two-thirds of their supply. The need to maintain these supplies, 
combined with the fact that these basins are in overdraft, means that 
prescription claims are a possibility. In addition, many of these basins 
are quite large in size; the land area of twelve out of the twenty 
unadjudicated basins exceeds 500 square miles. Ten of these are in the 
Central Valley, where agricultura! production is extensive and there are 
likely to be numerous individual landowners. Any adjudications pursued 
in these basins could potentially involve large numbers of parties. 
Toe implementation of SGMA would be challenging under any 
circumstances. The post-Mojave legal environment heightens the 
challenge and uncertainty across those hu�dred-plus basins throughout 
the state. As we have seen, the property rights system that serves as a 
backdrop to SGMA is both unclear and prone to disputation and delays 
in order to resolve the priority of pumping rights, prirnarily through 
adjudication of prescription claims. Although the recent streamlining 
legislation provides a sound framework for harmonizing adjudications 
that parallel SGMA efforts, it <loes not change this fundamental 
dynamic. Nevertheless, since Mojave, water users and their attomeys 
have in a number of cases been able to expeditiously reach settlements 
that achieve locally-desired results while staying within the contours of 
California water rights law. These basins pro vide a good roadmap for 
navigating SGMA in a way that complies with property rights priorities 
and minimizes adjudication delays. Doing this successfully will test the 
navigational skills of water users, attomeys, local officials, and state 
201. See CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNJA'.S GROUNDWATER UPDATE 2013, 
HYDROLOGIC REGION REPORTS FOR THE CENTRAL COAST, SAN JOAQUIN RIVER, ANO TULARE 
LAKE (2015). 
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regulators, and will provide an unfolding and undoubtedly fascinating 
response to the question posed in the title of this paper. 
Table 3. California's critically overdrafted basins:ª Cornparing size 
and urban dependence on groundwater as indicators of potential for 
conflict. 
Estimated % of 
Land municipal water use_ 
Population Area (sq. supplied by 
Basin narne !20tot mit g¡roundwater !201St 
Pajaro Valley 114
2




740 140 100 
Los Osos Valleye 13
2
948  11 100 
Santa Cruz Mid-
Countl ~52,000 56 ~100 
Cuyama Valley 1,236 378 100 
Merced 173 731 801 100 
Chowchilla 15 820 228 100 
Madera 116,919 543 100 
Indian W ells 
Valley 34
2
837 596 100 
Borrego SQrings 3
2
853 98 100 
Delta-Mendota 107 879 1194 100 
Kaweah 271 700 689 86 
Tulare Lake 125,701 837 79 
Tule 108,660 746 78 
KemCounty 700,323 2834 71 
Kings 906
2
544 1536 66 
Eastem San 
Joaguin 582,662 1207 43 
Pleasant Valley 69
2
362 31 42 
Westside 27,285 972 42 
Paso Robles Area 56,077 902 40 
Oxnard 235,973 90 35 
These 21 basins have been identified by the California Department 
of Water Resources as in "critica! overdraft," based on an analysis of 
groundwater trends over a ten-year assessment period and the presence 
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of adverse impacts of overdraft. See CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., 
CALIFORNIA'S ÜROUNDWATER: WORKING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 10, 
Bulletin 118 Interim Update (2016). 
CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA'S ÜROUNDWATER UPDATE 
2013, HYDROLOGIC REGION REPORTS (2015). Except for Santa Cruz-Mid 
County (see note f below), these data are based on 2003 groundwater 
basin boundaries, sorne ofwhich were revised in 2016. 
Cal. Dep't of Water Res., 2016 Groundwater Basin Boundaries 
Shapefile. 
Percentages represent a population-weighted average of percent 
reliance on groundwater for water suppliers in each basin that submitted 
2015 Urban Groundwater Management Plans. These plans are submitted 
only by suppliers with 3,000 connections or more, so small communities 
are not represented, nor are a few cities that failed to submit plans. 
UWMPs were not available for Cuyama and Westside basins. The 
Westside basin's percentage is based on estimates in the Department of 
Water Resources CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER UPDATE 2013, TuLARE
LAKE HYDROLOGIC REGION 26 (2015). Cuyama basin's sole reliance on 
groundwater is documented in the Cuyama Valley Groundwater 
Sustainability Agency's 2017 application to DWR's Sustainable 
Groundwater Planning Grant Program, Attachment 3, Category 2 Project 
Justification at 3. 
This basin is already adjudicated (and analyzed in this paper). 
The boundaries of the Santa Cruz Mid-County were changed 
substantially in 2016, so the population and municipal groundwater 
dependence data are approximate. The population estimate is based on 
the 2007 Saque/ Creek Water District and Central Water District 
Groundwater Management Plan at 1 O, whose boundaries most closely 
resemble those of the current basin. For municipal dependence on 
groundwater, this estimate is based on the Soquel Creek Water District's 
2015 UWMP, but <loes not reflect the portion of the City of Santa Cruz 
that falls within the basin and relies primarily upon local surface water. 
